Men convicted in fatal assault spared prison after Allahabad HC says later FIR came years after the probation period would have ended

The appellants were convicted under Sections 304 Part II/34, 323/34 and 325/34 IPC for a group assault in which Sattar sustained a fatal head injury and other persons were injured.

The trial court sentenced them to imprisonment and fine but did not consider release on probation.

In appeal, the appellants did not challenge their convictions and sought the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

Probation reports described the appellants’ circumstances; Shah Mohammad and Sirtaj also faced a 2025 FIR, followed by a charge-sheet, alleging a separate assault.

1. Whether the appellants’ offences and circumstances permitted their release on probation under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958

2. Whether the appellants’ conduct after conviction, including the 2025 allegations against Shah Mohammad and Sirtaj, precluded probation where the trial court had omitted to consider it at sentencing

Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 permits a court to release a person convicted of an offence not punishable with death or life imprisonment on probation of good conduct, having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the offender’s character; the court must consider any probation officer’s report and be satisfied as to the offender’s or surety’s fixed abode or regular occupation.

Under State of Karnataka v. Muddappa, Section 4 is not barred for an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC, although the circumstances must be considered.

Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Chellammal v. State establish that courts have a duty to consider the applicable probation provisions before imposing sentence; if probation is refused, reasons should be recorded.

As stated in Milind v. State of Maharashtra, Section 4 provides for consideration of antecedents and a supervisory mechanism.

The Court held that Section 304 Part II IPC did not exclude probation and that the appellants’ eligibility should have been considered when they were sentenced in 2013.

Because the trial court omitted that mandatory consideration, the Court treated the omission as a failure of justice.

It considered the probation reports and found no disqualifying material against Juber Ahmad and Sultan.

As to Shah Mohammad and Sirtaj, the 2025 FIR and charge-sheet concerned alleged conduct occurring long after the three-year period for which probation could have been imposed in 2013; the Court therefore found that those later allegations did not justify denying probation in this appeal.

The imprisonment imposed by the trial court need not be served, subject to the appellants furnishing personal bonds and two sureties to appear and receive sentence if called upon during a two-year period and, meanwhile, to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The fines were maintained and directed to be deposited within four weeks.