Mental distress alone does not establish undue influence without pleaded and proven dominance.

Lakshmi owned the suit property. After her son Karthick died, she executed a registered sale deed dated 9 November 2010 conveying a portion of the property to his minor children.

Lakshmi later sued to cancel the deed, alleging that her daughter-in-law and her relatives had pressured her to sign it while Karthick’s body was at home awaiting funeral rites.

The minors, represented by their mother, separately sued for partition, relying on the deed. The trial court cancelled the deed and dismissed the partition suit; the first appellate court affirmed.

In the second appeals, the High Court considered the pleadings, evidence and the parties’ conduct after execution

1. Whether the pleadings and evidence established that the sale deed was vitiated by undue influence, fraud or coercion, despite Lakshmi’s subsequent conduct and the alleged settlement of her son’s debts

2. Whether the courts below erred by finding fraud and coercion on suspicion and probability, without sufficient proof and despite relevant admissions by Lakshmi

3. Whether the judgments below were perverse because they failed to assess the evidence and applicable law properly

Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires specific particulars when fraud or undue influence is alleged; a general or vague plea is insufficient (Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 1279; Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, 1951 SCR 548).

Under Section 16 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, undue influence requires proof that one party was in a position to dominate the other’s will and used that position to obtain an unfair advantage; the burden does not shift merely because a transaction appears disadvantageous or an executant was distressed (Raghunath Prasad Sahu v. Sarju Prasad Sahu, 1923 SCC OnLine PC 62; Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, AIR 1967 SC 878; Anil Rishi v. Gurbaksh Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 558).

The Court also relied on Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash Singh, 2019 INSC 1015, for the proposition that age, vulnerability or family proximity alone does not establish domination.

It referred to Section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, concerning the burden of proving good faith in transactions involving active confidence, and treated the registered deed as carrying a presumption of due execution.

The Court held that Lakshmi had not pleaded the specific relationship or circumstances showing that the defendants dominated her will, or how they used such dominance to secure an unfair advantage; her general account of pressure during the funeral was insufficient.

The evidence also undermined her claim: she admitted that her son was known as both Karthick and Vijayan, addressing the discrepancy in the promissory notes; she also admitted that she had read the sale deed before signing it.

The Court further noted that the deed conveyed only a portion of the property to the deceased’s young children, in the context of repayment of debts incurred by the deceased, and was not shown to be unconscionable.

Lakshmi and her family continued living with the defendants for about six months without protest, and no police complaint or legal notice was made until a dispute arose over the LIC payment. The Court considered this conduct inconsistent with the pleaded coercion and found that the lower courts had overlooked material admissions and evidence.

It allowed S.A. No. 62 of 2018 and directed that a preliminary decree be entered for the minors’ claimed one-fourth share, with final-decree proceedings to commence after 90 days. The legal heirs of Lakshmi were also permitted to claim her share of the LIC payment in those proceedings.