Mere abduction does not constitute Section 366 IPC without proof of statutory intent.

The appellant was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, F.T.C., Bokaro, under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and sentenced to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000, with a default sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment.

The prosecution case was that, on 4 December 2013, the appellant—who was the victim’s brother-in-law—took her on his motorcycle on the pretext of dropping her at tuition, first took her to a quarter at Sector-11C, Bokaro, and subsequently to Hanuman Nagar, Patna, where she was allegedly threatened and forced into prostitution.

The victim’s parents later brought her back from Patna.

The prosecution examined eleven witnesses, including the victim, her parents, relatives, the investigating officer, the doctor and the Magistrate who recorded her statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The appellant denied the allegations in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and adduced no defence evidence.

He challenged the conviction and sentence in the present appeal.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant abducted or induced the victim with the intent that she would be compelled to marry or be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, as required under Section 366 IPC.

Whether the material contradictions, delay in lodging the FIR, the victim’s conduct, the medical evidence and the deficiencies in the investigation created a reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.

Whether the judgment of conviction dated 3 April 2017 and order of sentence dated 4 April 2017 were sustainable in law.

The Court applied Section 366 IPC, which criminalises kidnapping or abducting a woman with the intent that she may be compelled to marry against her will or be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, as well as inducing a woman by criminal intimidation, abuse of authority or other compulsion to go from one place to another for such purpose.

The Court held that mere abduction is insufficient; the prosecution must establish the specific intent required by Section 366 IPC, including the intention or knowledge that the woman would be compelled to marry or forced or seduced to illicit intercourse.

Relying on Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 6 SCC 664, the Court reiterated that mere abduction does not attract Section 366 IPC unless the statutory purpose and intent are proved.

The prosecution also bore the burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt, and material inconsistencies or circumstances creating reasonable doubt had to operate in favour of the accused.

The Court found that the victim’s testimony did not reliably establish the ingredients of Section 366 IPC.

Although she alleged that the appellant took her to Bokaro and later to Patna under threat and compelled her to engage in prostitution, she did not clearly explain what occurred between 4 and 11 December 2013, and stated that the appellant remained with her at Patna for only about two days before leaving.

The Court considered it difficult to accept that the appellant could have compelled her into prostitution when he was not continuously present, particularly as she remained at Dilip’s house for approximately two and a half months and ultimately contacted her mother from Dilip’s mobile phone.

The Court also noted inconsistencies concerning when the police were informed of the victim’s disappearance, the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR until 3 January 2014, and the failure of the police to participate in or properly investigate the recovery from Patna.

The medical evidence found no recent sexual intercourse and opined that the victim’s radiological age was above eighteen years, while no educational record establishing minority was produced.

In the cumulative assessment, the Court held that the evidence created serious doubt regarding the alleged abduction, coercion and intended prostitution, and did not prove the requisite statutory intent beyond reasonable doubt.

The judgment of conviction dated 3 April 2017 and order of sentence dated 4 April 2017 were set aside, and the criminal appeal was allowed.

As the appellant was already on bail, he was discharged from the liability of his bail bonds; the trial court record was directed to be returned, and any pending interlocutory application was disposed of.