Mere omission without knowledge that death is likely does not attract Section 304 Part II.

The petitioner supervised repair work, including replacement of tar sheeting (Dambar Patti), on a garage roof.

During the work, the slab collapsed, killing one worker and injuring another.

The police registered an FIR under Sections 304 Part II and 338 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and filed a chargesheet.

The petitioner sought to quash the FIR and chargesheet, contending that there was no material to show he knew the garage was structurally unsafe or that the repair work was likely to cause death or grievous injury.

The garage owner had initially been named as an accused, but the investigation against him was closed for insufficient evidence.

1. Whether the FIR and chargesheet disclosed a prima facie case under Section 304 Part II IPC against the petitioner, including the requisite knowledge that his act was likely to cause death.

2. Whether the material disclosed a prima facie case under Section 338 IPC, or otherwise justified continuing the prosecution against the petitioner.

Section 304 Part II IPC applies where culpable homicide is committed without an intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, but with knowledge that the act is likely to cause death; the prosecution material must prima facie disclose the elements of culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC.

The Court relied on Keshub Mahindra v. State of M.P., (1996) 6 SCC 129, for the requirement that the material must indicate an act accompanied by the requisite knowledge.

Shantibhai Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 13 SCC 231, for the principle that mere omission, lapse, or negligence, without something more positive, does not constitute culpable homicide.

Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, for the requirements of knowledge and absence of intention under Section 304 Part II IPC.

For Section 338 IPC, the Court stated that the act must have been done rashly or negligently so as to endanger human life or personal safety and must have resulted in grievous hurt.

The Court found no material in the FIR, statements, or chargesheet showing that the petitioner knew the garage was dilapidated or structurally unstable, or that the owner had informed him of its condition or of any structural audit.

Given that the assigned work was the ordinary task of removing and replacing tar sheeting on a garage slab, the Court held that the circumstances did not support an inference that the petitioner knew the work was likely to cause death or serious injury.

The alleged failure to provide supports or other safety measures was, on the material presented, an omission or lapse rather than a positive act accompanied by the knowledge required for Section 304 Part II IPC.

The Court also found no material prima facie demonstrating rash or negligent conduct by the petitioner for purposes of Section 338 IPC.

It exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and allowed the petition, quashing the FIR and resultant chargesheet qua the petitioner in terms of prayer clauses (c) and (d).