Mere pendency of criminal proceedings cannot justify arms-licence suspension absent recorded threat to public peace or safety.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 16 December 2025 passed by the Collector/District Magistrate, Gwalior, suspending her firearm licence bearing No. 746/2021 until the decision of the criminal case registered against her.

The petitioner contended that the suspension was based solely on the registration of an FIR arising from a business dispute, without any finding that she had used, displayed, or misused the licensed firearm, or that her possession of it threatened public peace or public safety.

The State defended the order on the ground that registration of the criminal case justified suspension of the licence.

Whether the licensing authority could suspend the petitioner’s arms licence under Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959, merely because a criminal case had been registered against her, without recording a specific satisfaction that continuance of the licence endangered public peace or public safety.

Whether an order suspending an arms licence “till the decision of the criminal case” was legally valid or constituted an indefinite and disproportionate suspension.

Whether the High Court could entertain the writ petition despite the statutory appellate remedy under Section 18 of the Arms Act, 1959, where the impugned order allegedly violated Section 17 and principles of natural justice.

Section 17(3)(b) of the Arms Act, 1959 permits suspension or revocation of an arms licence only where the licensing authority is satisfied that such action is necessary for the security of public peace or public safety.

Mere registration or pendency of a criminal case does not, by itself, justify suspension or revocation; the authority must rely on objective material and record a specific, reasoned satisfaction demonstrating how continuance of the licence would prejudice public peace or public safety.

The Court relied on Abdul Saleem v. State of M.P., 2019 (3) MPLJ 332, Gajendra Singh v. State of M.P., 2020 (2) MPLJ 441, Badshah alias Taj Mohammad v. State of M.P., 2007 (4) MPLJ 527, and the principles concerning public peace, public safety, and the distinction between public order and law and order discussed in Sunderlal Bhardwaj and Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, (1982) 2 SCC 403.

The suspension must also be proportionate and cannot ordinarily be imposed for an indefinite period merely until the conclusion of criminal proceedings.

A writ petition may be entertained despite an alternate remedy where the impugned action is passed in breach of statutory provisions and natural justice.

The Court found that the District Magistrate had proceeded primarily on the basis of the FIR and had not discussed any conduct of the petitioner showing that she posed a danger to public peace or public safety.

There was no finding or material indicating that the licensed firearm had been used or misused in the alleged offence, and the allegations appeared to concern a dispute arising from business transactions.

Consequently, the statutory satisfaction required under Section 17(3)(b) was absent and the order rested on apprehension rather than objective material.

Further, suspension “till the decision of the criminal case” amounted to an indefinite suspension and was disproportionate.

Since the order was also passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and was in derogation of Section 17, the Court held that the existence of an appellate remedy under Section 18 did not bar writ jurisdiction.

The respondents were directed to restore the arms licence and take necessary steps for returning the licensed firearm and ammunition, subject to compliance with statutory formalities.

The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the criminal case.