Mere procedural lapses, absent culpable intent or grave consequences, do not constitute misconduct.

The petitioner, then posted as Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Barh, was proceeded against departmentally in connection with Barh P.S. Case No. 93 of 2013.

Before registration of the FIR, his office issued a notice dated 27 April 2013 requiring the concerned persons to appear before him. After registration of the case on 02 May 2013, the accused persons’ godown-cum-mill was seized and one accused was arrested.

Complaints alleging custodial torture and misconduct by the petitioner were examined by senior police authorities and in an enquiry conducted pursuant to the Human Rights Commission’s direction; the allegations were found false or baseless.

However, a subsequent report found that the issuance of the notice and the seizure had not followed the prescribed procedure.

A departmental proceeding was initiated alleging procedural violations and illegal seizure. The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved, and the disciplinary authority imposed punishment.

In an earlier writ proceeding, the punishment order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration and personal hearing.

On reconsideration, the disciplinary authority imposed censure and stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect by order dated 08 January 2019; the petitioner’s review application was rejected on 13 September 2019.

1. Whether the alleged procedural lapses in issuing the notice dated 27 April 2013 and seizing the godown-cum-mill, in the absence of mala fide intention or other culpable conduct, constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary punishment?

2. Whether the departmental finding of guilt was sustainable when the documentary materials relied upon were not duly proved and the authors or relevant witnesses were not examined?

3. Whether the High Court, in exercise of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, could interfere with the disciplinary punishment on the grounds of evidentiary infirmity and violation of principles of natural justice?

The proceeding was examined under the Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005 and the procedural requirements associated with Section 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court relied on Union of India v. J. Ahmed, (1979) 2 SCC 286, holding that mere lack of efficiency, administrative deficiency, negligence or error of judgment does not automatically constitute misconduct.

Under A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 316, misconduct must have a clear foundation in the applicable service rules and cannot be created retrospectively by characterising an otherwise innocuous act as misconduct.

The Court also relied on Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, and State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, for the principle that a departmental enquiry is quasi-judicial and documents do not automatically become evidence merely by being placed on record; where their contents are disputed, they must be duly proved in a fair enquiry.

Judicial review remains limited but is available where findings are unsupported by evidence, relevant material is ignored, or principles of natural justice are violated.

The Court found that the serious allegations of custodial torture and ill-treatment had repeatedly been rejected by competent authorities, and that the departmental proceeding ultimately rested only on the alleged irregular issuance of the notice and seizure of the premises.

The charge memorandum did not allege mala fide intention, personal animosity, corrupt motive, undue benefit, or deliberate abuse of official position.

Applying J. Ahmed and A.L. Kalra, the Court held that the alleged conduct disclosed, at its highest, a procedural lapse, negligence or error of judgment and could not, without proof of culpable conduct or grave consequences, be elevated to misconduct.

Independently, the finding of guilt was vitiated because the documentary materials relied upon by the department were not duly proved and no relevant witness or author of the foundational reports was examined, despite the petitioner disputing the allegations.

The Court therefore held that the case involved a foundational evidentiary infirmity and was not merely an attempt to reappreciate evidence in judicial review.

The departmental finding was additionally unsustainable because the relied-upon documents had not been duly proved through appropriate evidence.

Accordingly, the punishment order dated 08 January 2019 imposing censure and stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect was quashed, as was the consequential review order dated 13 September 2019.

The petitioner was directed to receive all consequential benefits in accordance with law, and the writ petition was allowed without costs.