Mere recovery of tainted money cannot sustain conviction without proof of demand and acceptance.

The appellant, an Incharge Establishment Clerk in the office of the Block Development Officer, Larkipora, was alleged to have demanded ₹300 each from six Helpers for preparing and releasing arrears arising from their in-situ promotions.

The complainant, Bashir Ahmad Dar, lodged a complaint before the Vigilance Organization, Kashmir, alleging a total demand of ₹1,800.

A trap was laid on 10.09.2009; the appellant was allegedly seen accepting the money, which was subsequently recovered from the back pocket of his trousers.

His hands and trouser pocket allegedly turned pink on being washed in sodium carbonate solution.

After investigation and sanction for prosecution, the trial court framed charges under Sections 5(1)(d) read with 5(2) of the J&K Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 RPC.

The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to two years’ simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹21,000, with six months’ further imprisonment in default.

The appellant challenged the conviction in the present appeal.

1. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the initial demand of illegal gratification by the appellant

2. Whether the alleged demand and acceptance of ₹1,800 during the trap proceedings were proved through reliable and legally sufficient evidence, particularly when the shadow witness did not see the transaction

3. Whether mere recovery of tainted currency from the appellant’s trouser pocket, in the circumstances of the case, was sufficient to establish the offence of criminal misconduct

4. Whether the trial court’s judgment was sustainable despite its contradictory and perverse findings regarding demand, acceptance and the evidence of the shadow witness

The Court applied Sections 5(1)(d) and 5(2) of the J&K Prevention of Corruption Act, holding that the prosecution must establish the initial demand of illegal gratification, demand and voluntary acceptance during the trap, and recovery of the tainted money.

It relied on Mir Mustafa Ali Hashmi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2024) 10 SCC 489, for the principle that the trap-laying officer should, wherever practicable, independently verify the alleged demand before initiating trap proceedings, particularly where the complainant may bear a grudge against the accused.

Under Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration), (1979) 3 SCC 90, the uncorroborated testimony of a trap witness may be acted upon only where the court is satisfied that the witness is truthful and the circumstances justify reliance.

Relying also on M.O. Shamsudhin v. State of Kerala, (1995) 3 SCC 351, Ramesh Kumar Gupta v. State of M.P., (1995) 5 SCC 320, and Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, the Court held that there is no absolute rule against relying on an uncorroborated complainant, but such evidence must be carefully scrutinised and may require direct or circumstantial corroboration depending on the facts.

The Court found the initial demand doubtful because the five Helpers on whose behalf the alleged bribe was said to have been collected denied contributing money and denied that the appellant had demanded any gratification from them.

The complainant also contradicted his written complaint by denying that he had collected ₹300 from each associate.

The trap-laying officer failed to demonstrate any meaningful pre-trap verification of the alleged demand, despite evidence suggesting prior discord between the complainant and the appellant, including disputes concerning the engagement of the complainant’s brother and an alleged land dispute.

The shadow witness remained outside the room, did not see the exchange of money, and could not understand the conversation; the other trap witnesses likewise did not witness the transaction.

In view of the complainant’s demonstrated hostility and lack of corroboration, his testimony regarding demand and acceptance was held unsafe for reliance.

Once that testimony was disregarded, the recovery of money alone could not establish voluntary acceptance or criminal misconduct, particularly as the appellant had consistently stated that the money had been forcibly thrust into his pocket and had immediately protested false implication.

The trial court had itself noted several evidentiary deficiencies but nevertheless convicted the appellant, and its contrary findings regarding the shadow witness and proof of demand and acceptance were held perverse and internally inconsistent.

The trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence dated 21.08.2025 was set aside; the charge-sheet was dismissed and the appellant was acquitted.

His bail and surety bonds were directed to stand discharged, and the trial court record was ordered to be returned.