MHADA-authorized Executive Engineer can initiate summary eviction for redevelopment, Bombay High Court rules

Respondent Nos. 7 and 8 undertook redevelopment of Issa Building under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control and Promotion Regulations, 2034, after obtaining statutory permissions.

The building comprised 83 residential and non-residential units.

The petitioners, a group of tenants/occupants, challenged proceedings under Section 95A of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 (“MHADA Act”), initiated against them after they refused to vacate.

They contended that the Executive Engineer lacked authority to initiate the proceedings and that the developer had not complied with conditions of the MHADA No Objection Certificate (NOC), including conditions concerning Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements (PAAAs), area entitlement, corpus fund and a rehabilitation-construction bank guarantee.

The respondents maintained that the Executive Engineer had been authorized to act and that the relevant NOC obligations either had been met, had been offered, or fell due at a later stage.

Approximately 57 occupants had surrendered possession, 16 had been evicted under Section 95A orders, and 10 remained in occupation.

1. Whether proceedings initiated by the Executive Engineer under Section 95A of the MHADA Act were without jurisdiction or contrary to the statutory scheme.

2. Whether alleged non-compliance by the developer with NOC conditions rendered the Section 95A proceedings premature or unlawful.

Section 95A of the MHADA Act provides a summary eviction mechanism in specified redevelopment cases where the statutory prerequisites are met, including the required occupant consent and issuance of an NOC; the NOC holder must make temporary accommodation available or pay rent in lieu, and the Board may effect summary eviction when an occupant refuses to vacate.

Sections 2(3), 2(6), 16 and 18 establish the Authority, Boards and relevant officers as part of the Act’s administrative structure; the Chief Officer is an officer of the Board and is among the authorities charged with carrying out the Act.

Section 181 concerns delegation of powers exercisable by the Authority and does not, in the Court’s view, govern the Board’s internal assignment of functions to its officers.

The principle *delegatus non potest delegare* is subject to contrary indications in the statute’s language, scope and object.

In *Radhika George v. MHADA*, proceedings under Section 95A were held not to be a forum for a full judicial determination of redevelopment disputes.

*Sayed Anwar Gafoor v. Administrator and Divisional Commissioner* supported the exercise of statutory functions through authorized officers within the MHADA framework.

The Court distinguished *Sahni Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation*, *Javed Abdul Rahim Attar v. MHADA* and *Jugraj Tejraj and Sons v. Executive Engineer* on the issues and statutory contexts addressed in those cases.

The Court held that the Act’s administrative structure did not require the Board to pass a separate resolution for each executive step: the Chief Officer was part of the Board’s machinery, and the record showed both a 2022 administrative order assigning Section 95A actions to the Executive Engineer and a specific authorization dated 1 July 2026.

Those orders were not challenged.

Section 181 did not invalidate this internal assignment because the case did not involve delegation of the Authority’s powers.

As to the NOC, the Court accepted the respondents’ evidence that its conditions applied at different stages: rent and corpus had been offered or deposited, PAAAs were required before a later plinth-level commencement-certificate stage, and the 10% rehabilitation-construction deposit was due before demolition, which had not begun.

It therefore found no established current breach that made the Section 95A proceedings premature, while noting the Authority’s undertaking to enforce the NOC conditions and act on any established non-compliance.

It found no jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice or other illegality warranting interference under Article 226, and held that the proceedings had been initiated within the framework of Section 95A.

All connected writ petitions were dismissed, the Rule was discharged and there was no order as to costs; the respondents were expected to ensure compliance with the NOC conditions.