Section 468 CrPC limitation runs from filing the FIR, not the date of cognizance.

The informant alleged that, following a dispute over land in Bihta and the restoration of possession to him, the petitioners threatened to obstruct construction of a boundary wall and committed other offences.

The FIR was registered as Bihta P.S. Case No. 284 of 2012.

Although it initially alleged offences including extortion, criminal intimidation and theft, the police filed a charge-sheet against the petitioners only under Section 504 IPC.

The Magistrate took cognizance of that offence on 18 October 2016.

The petitioners sought to quash the cognizance order, principally arguing that it was barred by the one-year limitation under Section 468 CrPC because cognizance was taken more than four years after the alleged occurrence.

The informant maintained that the FIR had been filed within time and that the land dispute did not negate the alleged criminal conduct.

1. Whether cognizance of the offence under Section 504 IPC was barred by limitation under Section 468 CrPC because the Magistrate took cognizance more than one year after the alleged occurrence.

2. Whether the allegations and materials warranted quashing the cognizance order in the exercise of the High Court’s jurisdiction.

Section 504 IPC criminalises intentional insult of a kind intended or known to be likely to provoke a breach of the peace, and carries a maximum sentence of one year; Section 468 CrPC bars cognizance after the prescribed limitation period.

Relying on Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, the Court stated that the relevant date for limitation is the date of filing the complaint or FIR, rather than the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance.

The Court also considered whether the allegations and investigation materials disclosed a prima facie basis to proceed, rather than undertaking a mini-trial on the parties’ competing versions.

The Court rejected the limitation objection because the FIR was filed on 6 September 2012, the date it identified as the date of the incident; the Magistrate’s later action did not make the prosecution time-barred under the principle in Sarah Mathew.

It also treated the land dispute as distinct from the alleged conduct, noting the informant’s asserted title and formal restoration of possession, and concluded that alleged threats and obstruction of boundary-wall construction could constitute a separate criminal act.

Although the police had dropped the more serious allegations, the Court considered the charge-sheet’s retention of Section 504 IPC sufficient to disclose a prima facie case.

It further noted that the petitioners’ counter-case had been quashed, treating that circumstance as weakening their position.

It dismissed the application to quash the order dated 18 October 2016, taking cognizance under Section 504 IPC in Bihta P.S. Case No. 284 of 2012.