MP HC Appoints Neha Dashore Legal Guardian For 90%-Disabled Sister, Directs Authorities To Facilitate Representation

The petitioner, Neha Dashore, is the sister of Kopal Dashore.

After the deaths of their parents, she cared for Kopal and managed her maintenance, medical treatment, welfare, and daily needs.

Kopal had a 90% disability certificate and an intellectual disability that, according to the petitioner, prevented her from independently undertaking legal, financial, banking, medical, and administrative decisions.

The petitioner sought relief under Article 226, including recognition as legal guardian for the purpose of representing Kopal’s lawful interests before public authorities and other institutions.

The Court exercised its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and relied on the parens patriae principle, under which a constitutional court may act to protect the interests of a person unable to manage them independently.

It referred to decisions including Philomena Leo Lobo v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8836; R. Usha v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 13060/2020 (Madras High Court, 5 February 2021); Rajni Hariom Sharma v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 880; Sairabanu Mohammad Rafi v. State of M.P., 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 8091; Sayardevi Chaudhary v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 4238/2016 (Madras High Court, 29 June 2016); Shobha Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, W.P. No. 37278/2018 (Kerala High Court, 20 February 2019); Uma Mittal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine All 777; and Vandana Tyagi v. Government of NCT of Delhi, W.P.(C) No. 11003/2019 (Delhi High Court, 7 January 2020).

The judgment does not identify a separate statutory provision governing the appointment.

The Court considered the disability certificate showing 90% disability, the stated impact of Kopal’s intellectual disability, and the petitioner’s ongoing care and support.

Applying the parens patriae principle and the cited decisions, it concluded that the petitioner could be appointed to represent Kopal’s lawful interests.

The Court’s reasoning in para. 4 includes an apparent inconsistency: it states that there was no reason to exercise Article 226 jurisdiction, but para. 7 reaches the opposite conclusion and grants relief.

The operative decision is the allowance of the petition in para. 7.

It directed the respondent authorities and other concerned departments to facilitate her in that capacity before government and semi-government authorities, banks, financial institutions, medical institutions, and other competent authorities, to the extent permissible under law.