Non-disclosure of subsequent alienation of unsuitable alternative accommodation does not warrant revisional interference.

The petitioners-tenants challenged, under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), the order dated 10 June 2026 by which the learned ARC dismissed their application for leave to defend and passed an eviction order concerning premises C-1, Local Shopping Centre, Mezzanine Floor, Vasant Vihar, New Delhi.

The petitioners contended that Respondent No. 1 had concealed the subsequent sale, by Sale Deed dated 14 November 2025, of Shop No. F-43, First Floor, Triveni Complex, Sheikh Sarai, which had been disclosed in the eviction petition as an alternative property.

They also alleged that Respondent No. 1 had previously obtained possession of another premises and subsequently re-let it at an enhanced rent, indicating mala fide intent in the present eviction proceedings.

Respondent No. 1 maintained that F-43 had been expressly disclosed, but was unsuitable because it was on the first floor, required climbing more than 30 steps, and had no lift, whereas the tenanted premises were on the mezzanine floor and required only 8–9 steps.

The learned ARC accepted this assessment and held that the alternative premises were not reasonably suitable.

1. Whether the subsequent alienation of Shop No. F-43, after institution of the eviction petition but before the ARC’s order, constituted a material development requiring interference with the eviction order under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

2. Whether the alleged prior re-letting of another premises at an enhanced rent, read with the sale of F-43 and the existence of other properties, disclosed a genuine triable issue regarding the landlord’s bona fide requirement.

3. Whether the ARC’s dismissal of the application for leave to defend suffered from jurisdictional error, material irregularity, manifest illegality, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting revisional interference.

The Court applied Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, under which the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction over an order of the Rent Controller and cannot function as an appellate court or substitute its factual assessment merely because another view is possible.

It also applied Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, including the principle that the landlord’s bona fide requirement is presumptively valid but may be rebutted by substantive material disclosing a genuine triable issue.

Relying on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78; Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30; Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors., 2024:DHC:9322; and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, 2025:DHC:11285, the Court held that revision is confined to examining the legality and propriety of the decision-making process, including jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or failure to adjudicate a material plea.

The Court also considered Subhash Chand & Anr. v. Ravi Chand Garg, 2016:DHC:4565, but distinguished it on the ground that, in that case, the alternative properties had not been specifically addressed by the landlord or the ARC.

The principle that the landlord is generally the best judge of the suitability of premises was also applied, subject to the requirement that the need be bona fide and the alternative accommodation not be reasonably suitable.

The Court accepted that the sale of F-43 was a subsequent circumstance that had not been placed before the ARC, but held that non-disclosure alone did not establish a defect in the decision-making process.

The ARC had considered F-43 on the basis of its physical characteristics—its first-floor location, absence of lift, and requirement of more than 30 steps—and had given a reasoned finding that the mezzanine-floor tenanted premises, requiring only 8–9 steps, were more suitable for the 73-year-old landlord.

The subsequent sale did not invalidate those findings or demonstrate that the requirement for the subject premises was fabricated or that the ARC had proceeded on a fundamentally erroneous premise.

The Court further held that the allegation regarding prior re-letting was unsupported by documentary material before the ARC and, even when the additional material was considered, did not establish a nexus between the earlier transaction and the present bona fide requirement.

The petitioners’ challenge therefore sought a fresh factual appraisal and a different inference from the evidence, which was impermissible in revision under Section 25-B(8).

It held that the subsequent sale of F-43 did not render the ARC’s findings unsustainable, and that the allegations of mala fide conduct and prior re-letting did not disclose a genuine triable issue or establish any jurisdictional error, material irregularity, manifest illegality, or perversity.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the pending applications were disposed of.