Facts
The Petitioners (tenants) challenged a common final order dated 06.04.2026 passed by the learned ARC, East District, Karkardooma Courts, which had dismissed their application for leave to defend and passed eviction orders.
Source reference: para. 1-2The Respondents (landlords) sought eviction under the Delhi Rent Control (DRC) Act, 1958.
Source reference: para. 1-2The Petitioners contended that the eviction petitions were barred by Section 14(6) of the DRC Act, which prohibits a transferee landlord from filing an eviction petition for five years from the date of "acquisition".
Source reference: para. 1-2The Petitioners relied on a Settlement Deed dated 04.04.2019 and a Sale Deed dated 01.05.2019 to argue that acquisition/possession occurred in 2019, making the 2020 petitions premature.
Source reference: para. 3-4The ARC, however, ruled that acquisition occurred in 2010 via an Agreement to Sell, relying on the precedent in Jagdish Chander Gulati v. Ram Chand Lakram.
Source reference: para. 16-17Issues
1. Whether the learned ARC committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the effect of the admitted Settlement Deed (2019) and Sale Deed (2019) when determining the date of "acquisition" under Section 14(6) of the DRC Act.
Source reference: para. 4, 152. Whether the dispute regarding the date of delivery of possession constituted a "triable issue" warranting the grant of leave to defend.
Source reference: para. 5, 20Law Applied
The Court applied Section 14(6) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which imposes a five-year moratorium on eviction petitions following the acquisition of a property.
Source reference: para. 2Regarding revisional jurisdiction, the Court relied on the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act and the principles established in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua (2022) and Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998), which restrict the High Court’s role to supervising the legality and propriety of the decision-making process rather than acting as a court of appeal.
Source reference: para. 9-11Substantively, the Court examined the doctrine of "notional possession" at the time of an Agreement to Sell as per Jagdish Chander Gulati v. Ram Chand Lakram (1991).
Source reference: para. 6, 17Reasoning
The Court noted that while its revisional jurisdiction is restrictive and intended only to correct manifest errors of law or procedural impropriety, the ARC’s decision-making process was flawed due to the "omission to consider a material document".
Source reference: para. 11-15Specifically, the ARC relied solely on the 2010 Agreement to Sell but ignored Clause 9 of the admitted 2019 Settlement Deed, which explicitly stipulated that possession would only be handed over upon execution of the Sale Deed in 2019.
Source reference: para. 3, 17-18The Court reasoned that the interplay between this specific contractual stipulation and the general principle of symbolic possession in Jagdish Chander Gulati created a substantial question of fact.
Source reference: para. 21By overlooking these admitted documents, the ARC failed to recognize a bona fide triable issue regarding the statutory bar under Section 14(6), thereby necessitating judicial interference.
Source reference: para. 22-23Holding
The High Court held that the omission of the learned ARC to consider the 2019 Settlement Deed and Sale Deed constituted an error in the decision-making process.
The Court set aside the Impugned Order and remanded the matters to the learned ARC to reconsider the applications for leave to defend in light of the aforementioned documents; parties were directed to appear before the ARC on 31.07.2026.
Source reference: para. 24-25Original Court PDF
Sh Prem Prakash PapnejavsShri Padam Chand Gupta & Anr.
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in