Only the Chief Secretary is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Group-B non-gazetted TGTs.

The applicant, Ishwar Singh, was serving as a Trained Graduate Teacher (English), a Group-B non-gazetted post under the Directorate of Education, GNCTD.

A charge memorandum dated 6 February 2013 was issued to him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, alleging that, while acting as Deputy Superintendent in a Delhi University examination, he permitted eight students to sit in a room not included in the seating plan and allowed or failed to prevent the use of unfair means.

The applicant denied the charges. Following a departmental inquiry, the Inquiry Officer found both charges proved, and the report was supplied to the applicant on 2 September 2014.

The Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay for two years, with consequential postponement of future increments, by order dated 7 May 2015.

The applicant’s statutory appeal was rejected on 15 September 2016.

The applicant challenged the inquiry report, penalty order and appellate order, principally contending that the Deputy Director of Education was not the competent Disciplinary Authority to initiate proceedings against him and that the consequential orders were also passed by incompetent authorities.

The respondents defended the proceedings on the grounds that the inquiry complied with the applicable rules and principles of natural justice.

Whether the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant by the Deputy Director of Education were without jurisdiction because the Deputy Director was not the competent Disciplinary Authority for a Group-B non-gazetted Trained Graduate Teacher?

Whether the Inquiry Officer’s report, the penalty order dated 7 May 2015 and the appellate order dated 15 September 2016 were liable to be set aside on account of the lack of competence of the initiating and deciding authorities?

Whether the respondents could be permitted to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings through the competent Disciplinary Authority?

The Tribunal applied Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, governing the initiation of major-penalty disciplinary proceedings.

It relied upon the Tribunal’s decision in Rajesh Kumar Balara v. Chief Secretary, Government of Delhi & Ors., O.A. No. 3096/2018 and connected matters, which held that, for similarly placed Trained Graduate Teachers under the Directorate of Education, the Chief Secretary, Government of Delhi, and only the Chief Secretary, was competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

The High Court’s decision affirming that position in W.P. (C) No. 9216/2024, following the decision concerning Udal Singh, was also relied upon.

The governing principle was that disciplinary proceedings initiated or concluded by an authority lacking statutory competence are vitiated, irrespective of compliance with procedural safeguards or principles of natural justice.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was similarly situated to the employees in Rajesh Kumar Balara, namely, a Trained Graduate Teacher holding a Group-B non-gazetted post under the Directorate of Education.

Since the binding or persuasive precedent established that only the Chief Secretary was competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings against such employees, the Deputy Director of Education lacked jurisdiction to issue the charge memorandum.

The respondents’ contention that the inquiry had otherwise complied with the Rules and principles of natural justice did not cure this fundamental defect of statutory competence.

Following the Tribunal’s earlier ruling and its affirmation by the High Court, the Tribunal held that it was unnecessary to examine the merits of the charges or the evidentiary findings.

The defect also undermined the consequential penalty and appellate orders.

The Tribunal set aside the Inquiry Officer’s report communicated on 2 September 2014, the penalty order dated 7 May 2015 and the appellate order dated 15 September 2016.

The applicant was held entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with the applicable rules and law.

The respondents were directed to comply, preferably within four weeks of receipt of the certified order.

However, the respondents were granted liberty to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings, if so advised, strictly through the competent Disciplinary Authority and in accordance with law.

There was no order as to costs.