Order rejecting application to recall ex-parte release order is not appealable under Section 22 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972.

The respondent-landlord filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for a commercial shop to establish a clinic for her son.

During pendency, the original tenant died, and the petitioners (legal heirs) were substituted. Despite registered notices and a further opportunity granted by the Prescribed Authority on 20.07.2023, the petitioners failed to lead evidence.

An ex parte release order was passed on 22.12.2023.

The petitioners’ subsequent recall application was rejected on 07.02.2025.

Their appeal against this rejection was dismissed by the District Judge, Agra, as not maintainable on 03.02.2026; the petitioners then challenged these orders under Article 227.

1. Whether an appeal under Section 22 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 is maintainable against an order rejecting an application for recall of an ex parte release order.

2. Whether the petitioners established "sufficient cause" or absence of due service to warrant the recall of the ex parte release order dated 22.12.2023.

The Court applied Section 21 of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 regarding the substantive release of buildings and Section 22, which provides a right of appeal strictly against orders passed under Sections 21 or 24.

It relied on Section 34(1)(g) and Rule 22(b), which vest procedural powers in the Prescribed Authority to set aside ex parte orders.

Regarding "sufficient cause," the Court followed the principles in Parimal v. Veena (2011) and G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada (2000), holding that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and procedural law—as the "handmaid of justice"—cannot reopen concluded proceedings due to a party's negligence.

The Court reasoned that while Section 21 determines substantive civil rights, Section 34 is purely procedural.

Since Section 22 explicitly limits appeals to orders under Sections 21/24, a procedural order rejecting a recall application (referable only to Section 34/Rule 22) is not appealable.

Expanding Section 22 to include ancillary procedural orders would defeat the legislative intent and the goal of expeditious adjudication.

On the merits of the recall, the Court found that the judicial record proved the petitioners had been served via registered post and were granted additional time to contest, which they failed to utilize.

The petitioners failed to produce independent material to rebut the presumption of correctness of the judicial record regarding service; the Court invoked the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, noting the petitioners failed to exercise due diligence over inherited tenancy rights.

The petition was dismissed, and all impugned orders—the release order (22.12.2023), the rejection of recall (07.02.2025), and the dismissal of appeal (03.02.2026)—were upheld.