Order VI Rule 17 permits amending a Section 5 application to incorporate grounds showing sufficient cause.

The respondents were defendants in a civil suit in which an ex parte judgment and decree was passed on 27 September 2022. They instituted a first appeal on 10 April 2023, accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of a 162-day delay.

The appellate court initially condoned the delay by relying, inter alia, on Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In Civil Revision No. 201 of 2025, the co-ordinate Bench held that Section 14 was inapplicable because the earlier proceedings had not been conducted before a court lacking jurisdiction, set aside the order, and directed fresh consideration of the Section 5 application.

Instead of filing a fresh application under Section 5, the respondents sought amendment of their existing application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. The proposed amendment deleted the reference to protection under Section 14 and introduced grounds asserting sufficient cause for the delay, including their bona fide pursuit of proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

The appellate court allowed the amendment, permitting the petitioner to file consequential amendments and contest the Section 5 application on merits. The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution, contending that it violated the directions issued in the earlier revision and that a fresh Section 5 application was mandatory.

1. Whether the appellate court could allow amendment of the existing application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, instead of requiring the respondents to file a fresh application, after the earlier order had been set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration?

2. Whether the appellate court’s order allowing the amendment was perverse, illegal, or otherwise warranted interference under Article 227 of the Constitution?

3. Whether the respondents’ reliance on proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC could be considered as a ground of “sufficient cause” under Section 5, notwithstanding that such proceedings could not be invoked for exclusion of time under Section 14?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which a delayed appeal may be admitted if sufficient cause for the delay is established; and Section 14, which permits exclusion of time spent prosecuting a civil proceeding in good faith before a court unable to entertain it due to lack of jurisdiction or a similar defect.

It applied Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, empowering the court to allow amendments necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, subject to the due-diligence requirement after commencement of trial.

Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and Section 96(2) CPC recognise concurrent remedies against an ex parte decree, although the availability and continuation of one remedy may affect the other in accordance with law.

The Court also considered the principles discussed in *Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar*, *The Koushik Mutually Aided Cooperative Housing Society v. Ameena Begum*, and *N. Mohan v. R. Madhu*, particularly concerning the concurrent remedies of an application under Order 9 Rule 13 and an appeal under Section 96(2).

Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is warranted only where the subordinate court’s order discloses jurisdictional error, perversity, illegality, or substantial injustice.

The Court distinguished between the applicability of Section 14 and the permissible grounds under Section 5. It accepted that the earlier co-ordinate Bench had already held Section 14 inapplicable because the respondents had not prosecuted proceedings before a court lacking jurisdiction.

However, that finding did not prevent the respondents from asserting, under Section 5, that their conduct and pursuit of proceedings under Order 9 Rule 13 constituted sufficient cause for the delay.

The amendment did not seek to revive the rejected Section 14 claim; rather, it replaced that ground with grounds directed to the statutory requirement of sufficient cause under Section 5.

Since the petitioner remained entitled to oppose the amended application and the appellate court permitted consequential amendments and further submissions, no substantial prejudice was caused. The appellate court therefore acted within its procedural discretion under Order 6 Rule 17, and its order was neither perverse nor inconsistent with the earlier remand direction.

The amendment did not amount to circumventing the earlier revisional order and caused no substantial prejudice because the petitioner retained full opportunity to contest the amended application.

Finding no illegality or perversity warranting interference under Article 227, the Court dismissed Misc. Petition No. 5723 of 2026 and upheld the appellate court’s order permitting amendment of the Section 5 application.