P&H HC Protects Faridabad Woman’s Possession In Khasra 122, Lets HUDA Pursue Encroachment After Notice And Fresh Demarcation

In brief

The question

1. Whether the concurrent findings protecting the respondent’s possession and invalidating the 2015 notice disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

The court held

The High Court dismissed the regular second appeal, finding that no substantial question of law arose.

It also directed

It clarified that the decree protects the respondent’s possession of the property in Khasra No. 122, but does not bar fresh demarcation by a competent authorised agency after notice and an opportunity for the respondent to participate, or subsequent proceedings in accordance with law if encroachment on Khasra Nos. 111 or 112 is established.

No demolition or dispossession may be based merely on an unverified assertion about the property’s location.

01Facts

The respondent claimed possession of House No. 277-B, Shastri Colony, Faridabad, asserting that it was situated in Khasra No. 122 and had been purchased from Mohammad Usman.

pp. 1, 3–4 · ¶ 2, 9–11

In earlier litigation, a 1992 decree protected Usman’s possession in Khasra No. 122 while preserving the appellants’ right to remove any encroachment on Khasra Nos. 111 and 112 after demarcation by an authorised agency and notice to the occupant.

pp. 1, 3–4 · ¶ 2, 9–11

Following a 2015 notice alleging occupation of acquired land in Khasra No. 111, the respondent sued for declaration and permanent injunction.

pp. 1–2 · ¶ 1, 3–5

The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court dismissed the appellants’ appeal.

pp. 1–2 · ¶ 1, 3–5

The High Court considered the appellants’ second appeal against those concurrent decisions.

p. 2 · ¶ 6

02Issues

i.1. Whether the concurrent findings protecting the respondent’s possession and invalidating the 2015 notice disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

pp. 5–7 · ¶ 19, 22–24

ii.2. Whether the injunction could prevent the appellants from pursuing lawful proceedings to remove any encroachment on acquired Khasra Nos. 111 and 112.

pp. 3–6 · ¶ 9–13, 19–21

03Law Applied

Under Section 100 CPC, a regular second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law; concurrent findings of fact are not reopened merely because another view of the evidence is possible, absent perversity, misreading of evidence, or application of an incorrect legal principle (Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545; Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722).

p. 6 · ¶ 22–23

A person in settled possession ordinarily cannot be dispossessed by force or otherwise than in accordance with law, but that protection does not confer ownership or bar lawful proceedings by the true owner or competent authority (Rame Gowda (Dead) by LRs v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs, (2004) 1 SCC 769; Premji Ratansey Shah v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 547).

p. 5 · ¶ 18

A decree must be read as a whole: the earlier decree protected possession in Khasra No. 122 while reserving the appellants’ right to remove encroachments from Khasra Nos. 111 and 112 after authorised demarcation and notice.

pp. 3–4 · ¶ 10–12

Provisions in the judgment · 1 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Section 100

04Reasoning

The earlier decree and the 1992 demarcation report (Ex. P6) supported the finding that the existing house was in Khasra No. 122.

pp. 4–5 · ¶ 14–16

The appellants produced no subsequent demarcation establishing encroachment on Khasra No. 111; their witness had not visited the property or participated in demarcation, and no departmental demarcation report was produced.

pp. 4–5 · ¶ 14–16

The respondent was therefore entitled to protection against interference based on the unsubstantiated allegation, but could claim no greater protection than Usman and could not prevent lawful action concerning any encroachment on Khasra Nos. 111 or 112.

pp. 4–6 · ¶ 13, 17–21

The courts’ factual findings disclosed no basis for second-appellate interference.

p. 6 · ¶ 22–24