P&H HC Rejects Compromise Bid To Undo Convictions Over 1997 Police-Station Torture Of 16-Year-Old Student

Respondent No. 2, then a 16-year-old student, was called to a police station in 1997 and made to perform approximately 570 sit-ups under threat of violence.

He later suffered acute renal failure and required haemodialysis.

After trial, petitioner No. 1 was convicted under Sections 307/120-B and 342/120-B IPC; petitioner No. 2, an ASI, was convicted under Sections 307, 342 and 384 IPC.

Their appeals were pending before the High Court.

The petitioners sought, under Section 482 CrPC, to quash the criminal complaint and set aside the conviction and sentence orders on the basis of a 2024 compromise.

The complainant and petitioners confirmed the compromise before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who found it genuine and voluntary.

The complainant supported the petition, while the State stated that the compromise was a matter of record.

Section 482 CrPC confers inherent power to quash proceedings, including in appropriate cases involving non-compoundable offences, but that power must be exercised sparingly.

Under Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, offences committed by public servants in the discharge of their duties should not be quashed merely because of a compromise; further, once conviction for a heinous offence under Section 307 IPC has been recorded, a compromise at the appellate stage is not, by itself, a ground for acquittal.

Ramgopal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021(4) RCR (Criminal) 322, concerns non-heinous offences or offences predominantly private in nature, while Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2007(3) RCR (Criminal) 1052, addressed matters such as matrimonial, landlord-tenant and commercial disputes.

The Court treated the case as one involving custodial torture of a minor by police personnel, rather than a private dispute.

The trial court had found that the complainant’s life was saved by timely haemodialysis; the Court therefore characterised the conduct as an offence against society and the rule of law, which the victim alone could not condone.

Because petitioner No. 2 was a police officer and the conviction under Section 307 IPC had been entered after trial, the case fell within the principles in Narinder Singh.

Petitioner No. 1’s conviction for conspiracy with the police officials could not be separated from that conduct.

The Court distinguished the authorities relied upon by the petitioners and held that the pending appeals, rather than a compromise-based Section 482 petition, were the forum for examining the correctness of the convictions on their merits.

It clarified that its observations would not affect the merits of the pending appeals.