Participation in a sudden quarrel without proved common intention attracts Section 304 Part II, not Section 302/34 IPC.

On 22 August 1993, Giridhari Pradhan was allegedly assaulted while working in his paddy field following an agricultural land dispute. The prosecution alleged that Baikuntha Pradhan assaulted Giridhari with a farsa, while the other accused persons assaulted him with lathis and other weapons. When Giridhari’s daughter, Swarnalata (PW-8), intervened, Baikuntha allegedly assaulted her on the head and another accused assaulted her hand, causing injuries. Giridhari subsequently died from multiple injuries, including a head injury, bruises, fracture and haemorrhage.

The trial Court convicted all the accused under Section 302/34 IPC and convicted Baikuntha, Nirakar and Padmalochan under Sections 326/34 and 506/34 IPC. During the pendency of the appeal, the appeal in respect of Nirakar, Padmalochan and Banamali abated. The present appeal was therefore considered only in respect of Baikuntha, Hrusikesh and Laxmikanta.

The principal prosecution evidence was that of PW-8, an injured eyewitness and the deceased’s daughter, supported by other eyewitnesses and medical evidence.

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the presence and specific overt acts of Hrusikesh Pradhan and Laxmikanta Pradhan in the assault on Giridhari?

Whether Baikuntha Pradhan’s participation in the assault was proved despite inconsistencies regarding the weapon allegedly used and the non-recovery of the farsa?

Whether Baikuntha shared a common intention with the other accused so as to sustain his conviction under Section 302/34 IPC?

If Section 302/34 IPC was not established, whether Baikuntha was individually liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC, and whether the convictions under Sections 326/34 and 506/34 IPC could be sustained?

The Court applied Section 302 IPC concerning murder, Section 304 Part-II IPC concerning culpable homicide not amounting to murder where the accused acts with knowledge that death is likely but without the requisite intention for murder, and Section 34 IPC concerning joint liability pursuant to a common intention.

The Court held that common intention requires a prior meeting of minds, which may be inferred from conduct and circumstances but cannot be presumed merely because several persons participated in an occurrence.

Under the settled law governing eyewitness testimony, a conviction may rest on a solitary witness if the testimony is wholly reliable; however, the evidence must be scrutinised carefully, particularly where the witness is related to the deceased or where material omissions and contradictions affect the accused’s participation.

The Court relied on Panchu @ Panchunath Pradhan v. State of Orissa, Ramji Surjya Padvi v. State of Maharashtra, (1983) 3 SCC 629, and Amar Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 19 SCC 165, for the principle that the quality, rather than quantity, of evidence is determinative.

The Court also considered the evidentiary relevance of the deceased’s statement under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, insofar as it related to the cause or circumstances of his death.

The Court found that PW-8’s status as an injured eyewitness and daughter of the deceased did not, by itself, make her evidence unreliable.

However, her allegations concerning Hrusikesh and Laxmikanta were not corroborated by PWs-4, 7, 9 or 11. Those witnesses had not stated before the Investigating Officer that Hrusikesh and Laxmikanta were present or had committed the specific overt acts later attributed to them at trial.

The deceased’s statement, Ext. E, also named Nirakar, Padmalochan and Baikuntha but omitted Hrusikesh and Laxmikanta. These omissions related to their very presence and participation and were therefore material, entitling them to the benefit of doubt.

In Baikuntha’s case, the Court separated the reliable portion of the prosecution evidence from the doubtful portion. PWs-4, 7 and 11 consistently placed Baikuntha at the scene and described his participation in the assault, although the evidence differed as to whether he carried a farsa or a bahungi.

The non-recovery of the farsa and the absence of any reference to it in the earliest statements weakened the prosecution’s specific claim regarding that weapon, but did not disprove Baikuntha’s presence or participation.

The evidence indicated that the incident arose from a land-related quarrel and mutual assault, with Baikuntha arriving thereafter. There was no reliable proof of a prior concert or pre-arranged plan between him and the other accused. Consequently, Section 34 IPC was held inapplicable.

Nevertheless, Baikuntha intentionally joined the assault, and the multiple injuries, including the head injury and fracture, showed that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was likely to cause death. Since premeditation and the specific intention required for murder were not established, his liability was reduced to Section 304 Part-II IPC.

The convictions under Sections 326/34 and 506/34 IPC were also unsustainable because common intention was not proved and the evidence did not independently establish that Baikuntha caused PW-8’s grievous injury with a farsa or criminally intimidated her.

Baikuntha Pradhan’s conviction under Section 302/34 IPC was modified to one under Section 304 Part-II IPC; his convictions under Sections 326/34 and 506/34 IPC were set aside.

He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for ten years, with the period already undergone set off. As he had already undergone more than ten years’ imprisonment, he was directed to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.