Pendency of a title suit does not stay execution of a final eviction arbitral award.

The petitioner, the award debtor, was inducted by the opposite party into premises no. P-10, Taratala Road, Kolkata, under an agreement dated 26 December 2004 for six years commencing from 1 November 2005.

In subsequent arbitral proceedings, an interim award dated 15 July 2017, as corrected on 22 July 2017, directed the petitioner’s eviction from the premises.

The petitioner’s challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was dismissed, and the appeal under Section 37 was also dismissed on 22 April 2025; the Special Leave Petition was dismissed as “not pressed” on 1 September 2025.

During execution of the eviction award, the petitioner filed IA No. 5 of 2026 under Section 47 read with Order XXI Rule 29 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking stay of execution.

The Commercial Court dismissed the application, and the petitioner invoked Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner could resist execution of the final eviction award under Section 47 CPC by contending that the opposite party’s lease deed and title were under challenge in a pending suit?

Whether the pendency of the petitioner’s suit justified a stay of execution under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC?

Whether the Commercial Court’s refusal to stay execution disclosed an error warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution?

Section 47 CPC permits objections to the executability of a decree only within a narrow compass, principally where there is a jurisdictional infirmity or the decree is a nullity; errors of fact or law cannot ordinarily be reopened at the execution stage.

Order XXI Rule 29 CPC confers a discretionary power to stay execution where a suit is pending against the decree-holder, subject to such terms as to security or otherwise as the executing court considers appropriate.

Section 116 of the Evidence Act embodies the tenant/licensee estoppel principle, preventing a person inducted into possession from denying the title or right to possession of the person who inducted him.

The Court relied on Shaukat Hussain alias Ali Akram v. Smt. Bhuneshwari Devi, (1972) 2 SCC 731, and Sri Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir, (1981) 4 SCC 421, regarding the power to stay execution under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC, and on Electrosteel Steel Limited v. Ispat Carrier Private Limited, (2025) 7 SCC 773, and MMTC Limited v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Private Limited, (2026) 3 SCC 99, regarding the limited scope of objections under Section 47 CPC.

The Court held that the eviction award had attained finality after dismissal of the petitioner’s Section 34 and Section 37 challenges and dismissal of the Special Leave Petition as not pressed.

Since the petitioner had entered the premises under an agreement with the opposite party, Section 116 of the Evidence Act applied, and the petitioner was estopped from indirectly disputing the opposite party’s right to possession by challenging the latter’s lease from KoPT/SMPK.

The pending title suit concerned the opposite party’s rights under the 2015 lease deed, but it could not affect the already-adjudicated licensor–licensee relationship between the parties or the final eviction award.

The petitioner’s Section 47 application effectively sought a retrial or reconsideration of matters already adjudicated in the arbitral and supervisory proceedings, rather than demonstrating that the award was a jurisdictional nullity or inherently void.

Consequently, mere pendency of the suit did not warrant a stay under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC, and the Commercial Court had properly exercised its discretion in refusing relief.

It held that the pending suit challenging the opposite party’s lease deed did not render the final eviction award inexecutable and did not justify a stay under Order XXI Rule 29 CPC.

The petitioner’s application under Section 47 CPC was treated as an impermissible attempt to reopen the arbitral proceedings.

Finding no jurisdictional error or impropriety in the Commercial Court’s order, the Court declined to interfere under Article 227 and dismissed C.O. No. 2227 of 2026, without any order as to costs.