Pleading amendments cannot resile from categorical denials or introduce mutually destructive defences.

The respondent supplied Kota stone, granite and sandstone to the petitioner and instituted a commercial suit for recovery of ₹17,42,216 with interest, alleging non-payment.

The petitioner filed its written statement on 26 July 2021, categorically denying receipt of tax invoices, the alleged transactions, and any amount payable to the respondent.

The petitioner also denied the existence of purchase orders in its affidavit of admission/denial of documents.

On 5 February 2024, after approximately three years, the petitioner applied under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend its written statement by pleading that it had issued only three purchase orders, valued at ₹43,36,162, whereas the respondent had raised invoices for ₹76,20,362.

The Trial Court dismissed the amendment application, holding that the proposed amendment sought to alter the petitioner’s categorical denial and was not based on any new fact.

The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner could amend its written statement under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to plead the existence and limited value of purchase orders after having categorically denied the existence of the purchase orders and tax invoices in its original pleadings and affidavit of admission/denial.

Whether the proposed amendment was liable to be allowed as necessary for determining the real controversy, particularly when the application was filed before evidence had commenced and the petitioner claimed that the relevant facts had subsequently come to its knowledge.

Whether the Trial Court’s refusal to permit the amendment disclosed any jurisdictional infirmity, perversity or patent illegality warranting interference under Article 227.

Order VI Rule 17 CPC permits amendment of pleadings when necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, but the discretion is not absolute; after commencement of trial, the applicant must establish that, despite due diligence, the matter could not have been raised earlier.

A categorical admission ordinarily cannot be withdrawn, though it may be explained or clarified; alternative pleas are permissible only if they are not mutually destructive, as held in Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly, (2008) 7 SCC 85.

The Court also considered Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K.K. Modi, (2006) 4 SCC 385, and Time Warner Entertainment Co., LP v. A.K. Das, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1421, which support a liberal approach where an amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy, particularly due to subsequent events, but distinguished them because the present amendment sought to introduce a contradictory defence based on facts allegedly known to the petitioner from the outset.

Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 does not warrant interference absent jurisdictional error, perversity or patent illegality.

The Court held that the proposed amendment was not a clarification or elaboration of the petitioner’s existing defence.

The original written statement denied that the respondent had issued tax invoices and expressly asserted that no amount was payable; the petitioner’s affidavit of admission/denial also denied the existence of purchase orders.

The proposed amendment, however, sought to affirmatively plead that three purchase orders had in fact been issued and to rely on their aggregate value to dispute the respondent’s invoices.

This amounted to retracting the petitioner’s categorical denial and substituting it with a mutually destructive factual defence.

The explanation that the purchase orders came to the petitioner’s knowledge only upon later scrutiny was found unconvincing, particularly because the documents were the petitioner’s own purchase orders dating back to 2015–2016 and should reasonably have been available when the written statement was prepared.

Accordingly, the liberal approach to amendment could not assist a party seeking to introduce an afterthought and resile from its earlier stance.

It held that the petitioner could not withdraw its categorical denial and introduce a mutually destructive defence based on its own purchase orders.

The Court found no jurisdictional infirmity, perversity or patent illegality warranting interference under Article 227, and dismissed the pending applications as well.

It clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the parties’ underlying claims.