Post-conviction compromise cannot compound non-compoundable offences but may justify reducing sentence to time served.

The appellants were convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gwalior, in Sessions Trial No. 71/2011 for offences under Sections 307/149 IPC (three counts), 324/149 IPC (three counts), 323/149 IPC (six counts), and Sections 147 and 148 IPC. They were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment and fines.

The prosecution alleged that, on 16 April 2010, the appellants, armed with lathis and farsas, assaulted Kamal Singh, Hemant, Bindu Kushwah, and others due to prior enmity; the injured persons included the complainant, his brother, father, and Kallu.

After investigation and trial, the appellants were convicted; the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and the defence examined seven witnesses.

During the appeals, the parties entered into a voluntary compromise, which was verified by the Principal Registrar, although the offences were non-compoundable.

The appellants did not challenge their convictions and sought reduction of their custodial sentences to the periods already undergone, relying on the compromise, the existence of a cross-case, the parties’ relationship, and the prolonged pendency of the proceedings.

1. Whether the appellants’ convictions under Sections 307/149, 324/149, 323/149, 147 and 148 IPC were sustainable on the evidence on record despite the parties’ compromise.

2. Whether, although the offences were non-compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, the compromise could be considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing the appellants’ sentences to the periods already undergone.

3. Whether the sentence should be modified by enhancing the fine imposed under Section 307/149 IPC.

The Court applied Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 323 and 324 IPC concerning rioting, unlawful assembly, attempt to murder and voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons.

It recognised that the offences under Sections 147, 148, 324/149 and 307/149 IPC are non-compoundable under Section 320 CrPC and therefore the compromise could not itself result in compounding or acquittal.

Relying on Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court noted that, in appropriate cases involving essentially personal disputes, compromise may be relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion.

Under Ishwar Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the fact of compromise may be considered while determining the substantive sentence, even though a non-compoundable offence cannot be formally compounded.

Unnikrishnan alias Unnikuttan v. State of Kerala was relied upon for the principle that a compromise may justify reduction of sentence while maintaining the conviction.

The Court also applied Bhagwan Narayan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, which holds that compromise is only one sentencing factor and must be assessed along with proportionality, deterrence, rehabilitation, and other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

The Court independently examined the conviction despite the appellants’ limited challenge to sentence. It found that the testimony of the complainant and injured eyewitnesses was corroborated by medical and documentary evidence, and that the trial court’s findings were supported by sound reasoning.

Since the compromise was voluntary and genuine but related to non-compoundable offences, it could not invalidate the convictions or permit formal compounding.

However, the Court treated the compromise as a mitigating sentencing circumstance, particularly because the parties were relatives residing in the same society, had settled their dispute, had lived peacefully for several years, and no criminal antecedents of the appellants were shown.

Considering these factors, the appellants’ periods of incarceration, and the prolonged pendency of the matter, the Court concluded that further imprisonment would serve no useful purpose.

The custodial sentences were reduced to the periods already undergone.

The fine under Section 307/149 IPC was enhanced from ₹2,000 to ₹5,000 on each count, with any amount already deposited to be adjusted.

The appellants were directed to deposit the entire fine within 30 days of release; failing such payment, they were required to surrender and undergo the remaining sentence imposed by the trial court, including the default stipulations.

Their bail bonds were discharged, the trial court’s order regarding disposal of property was affirmed, and the appeals were disposed of accordingly.