Preventive detention cannot be resorted to for ordinary law and order issues lacking impact on public order.

The petitioner, Ajit @ Jangio Ramanbhai Raval, was preventively detained following an order dated 30.01.2026 passed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad

The authority classified him as a "dangerous person" under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA), citing three pending criminal cases registered between May and December 2025 under Section 303(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)

The petitioner had already been granted bail by the concerned courts in all three underlying offences prior to the detention order

The petitioner challenged the legality of this detention through a writ petition

1. Whether the detention order passed by the Detaining Authority under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in law or lacks subjective satisfaction

2. Whether the criminal antecedents of the detenue, in which he was already granted bail, were sufficient to demonstrate a threat to "public order" as opposed to mere "law and order"

The Court primarily applied Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "dangerous person" as one who habitually commits or attempts to commit specific offences under the IPC (now BNS) or Arms Act

It relied on the constitutional safeguards under Article 22(3)(b) regarding preventive detention and the principle that such powers are extraordinary and must be used sparingly

Furthermore, the court applied the precedent of *Dhanya M. v. State of Kerala and others* (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which established that the State should seek cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to preventive detention unless there is a clear nexus to the disturbance of public order

The Court reasoned that for an individual to be detained under PASA, their activities must be "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order," a higher threshold than a simple breach of law and order

Upon reviewing the three criminal cases cited, the Court found no evidence that these specific acts disturbed public peace, health, or tranquility at large

The Court observed that since the petitioner was already granted bail in the underlying offences, the appropriate remedy for the State, if it feared further offenses, was to move for the cancellation of bail rather than circumventing ordinary criminal procedure through an extraordinary detention statute

Consequently, the Detaining Authority’s subjective satisfaction was deemed mechanical and without sufficient material to link the petitioner's actions to a public order crisis

The Court held that the material on record was insufficient to prove that the petitioner’s activities adversely affected the maintenance of public order, rendering the detention order illegal and invalid

The Court directed that the detenue be set at liberty forthwith, provided he is not required in any other case