Preventive detention lacks subjective satisfaction if alleged bootlegging activities fail to affect maintenance of public order.

The petitioner, Yogeshkumar @ Yogi Mevalal Soni, was detained by an order dated 02.02.2026 passed by the Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985 (PASA Act).

The authority classified the petitioner as a "bootlegger" based on two criminal cases registered under the Prohibition Act between May and December 2025.

The petitioner, currently held in Surat Jail, challenged the detention order through his brother, contending it was passed mechanically without evidence that his activities disturbed public health or public order.

Whether the activities of the petitioner as a "bootlegger" were sufficient to establish that he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of "public order" under Section 3 of the PASA Act.

Whether the detention order is sustainable in law when the petitioner had already been granted bail in the substantive criminal offenses cited as grounds for detention.

The court applied Section 2(b) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act, 1985, which defines a "bootlegger".

It relied on the principle that preventive detention is an extraordinary power and should be used as an exception to Article 21 of the Constitution only in rare cases.

The court applied the precedent of Dhaya M. v. State of Kerala (AIR 2025 SC 2868), which emphasizes that the State should seek cancellation of bail under ordinary criminal law rather than resorting to preventive detention.

Furthermore, it cited Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, holding that the law of preventive detention must be strictly construed and cannot be used merely to "clip the wings" of an accused facing criminal prosecution.

The Court examined the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority and found it flawed.

It observed that the mere registration of two prohibition cases does not automatically translate into a disturbance of "public order".

The Court reasoned that "public order" is distinct from "law and order"; the alleged offenses did not have a sufficient bearing on the maintenance of public order to justify the curtailment of personal liberty.

Additionally, the Court noted that the petitioner had been granted bail by competent courts for the predicate offenses.

Following Supreme Court mandates, the High Court held that when ordinary criminal law provides sufficient means to address the State's apprehensions—such as applying for bail cancellation—the use of an extraordinary preventive detention statute is an unwarranted circumvention of standard legal procedures.

The Court allowed the petition, quashed the detention order dated 02.02.2026, and directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith.

Rule was made absolute.