### Procedural Rigidity Cannot Defeat Substantial Justice When Delay in Setting Aside Abatement is Reasonably Explained Brief Summary: The High Court of Madhya Pradesh set aside an order of the First Appellate Court which had dismissed a civil appeal as abated. The lower court had rejected applications for substitution of legal representatives and condonation of delay on technical grounds. Justice Anuradha Shukla observed that the appellants had provided a reasonable explanation via an unrebutted affidavit regarding their ignorance of the pending litigation. Reaffirming Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that Order 22 of the CPC is a rule of procedure meant to facilitate justice, not a penal provision to curtail substantial rights. Consequently, the Court condoned the delay, set aside the abatement, and restored the appeal for hearing on merits.

The respondent (plaintiff) secured an eviction and rent arrears decree against Dayal Chand Sharma (original defendant).

Sharma challenged this via Regular Civil Appeal No. 21-A/2004.

During the pendency of the appeal, Sharma died on 25.04.2004.

On 14.12.2004, his legal representatives (LRs) filed three applications: to substitute LRs (Order 22 Rule 3 CPC), to condone delay (Section 5, Limitation Act), and to set aside the abatement (Order 22 Rule 9 CPC).

The first appellate court dismissed the appeal, ruling it had abated because the delay was not convincingly explained.

The LRs appealed to the High Court, asserting they were unaware of the litigation and the eldest son, Bharat, had been incarcerated.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the appeal by rejecting the application for setting aside the abatement solely on the grounds of delay

The Court applied Order 22 Rules 3 and 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) regarding the substitution of parties and setting aside abatement, alongside Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

It relied on the Supreme Court precedent in *Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Smt. Pramod Gupta* (2003), which established that procedural laws are tools for justice and should not be construed rigidly to foreclose adjudication on merits.

Furthermore, it cited *Banwari Lal v. Balbir Singh* (2016), holding that Order 22 CPC is not penal in nature and substantial rights should not be defeated by a pedantic or strictly procedural approach.

The Court observed that the application for condonation of delay was supported by an affidavit from Bharat Sharma (eldest LR), citing ignorance of the litigation and his own imprisonment as reasons for the delay.

Crucially, the respondent failed to file a rebuttal affidavit, leaving the LRs’ claims uncontroverted.

The Court reasoned that unless there were compelling reasons to disbelieve the unrebutted affidavit, the LRs should not be deprived of their right to appeal.

Aligning with the principle that procedural rules are flexible "tools of convenience" rather than rigid obstacles, the Court found the first appellate court’s approach too technical and pedantic.

The Court held that the delay was reasonably explained.

It directed that the LRs of Dayal Chand Sharma be substituted on record, the cause title be amended, and the Regular Civil Appeal No. 21-A/2004 be restored for consideration on merits.

Parties were directed to appear before the first appellate court on 22.04.2026.