Prolonged appellate delay may be condoned where the litigant diligently pursues remedies in good faith.

The appellant challenged three orders of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Regulatory Commission (“Commission”): (i) order dated 09.07.2024 in MP No. 28/2023 concerning the cap on Average Power Purchase Cost (“APPC”) for wind energy; (ii) review order dated 28.01.2025 in RP No. 2/2024; and (iii) order dated 17.02.2026 in MP No. 41/2025 dismissing the appellant’s clarification petition.

The Commission had held that the 75% cap could not be applied to APPC based on the competitively discovered tariff, directed payment at the full APPC rate where it did not exceed the applicable preferential tariff, and prescribed payment at 75% of the preferential tariff where the APPC exceeded it.

The appellant had earlier filed Appeal No. 131 of 2025 before the Tribunal challenging the first order. During its pendency, it filed a clarification petition before the Commission concerning the review order and subsequently withdrew the appeal with liberty to reagitate the issues after disposal of the clarification petition.

After the clarification petition was dismissed on 17.02.2026, the appellant filed the present appeal. The delay was calculated as 632 days in challenging the first order and 424 days in challenging the second order, inclusive of the statutory 45-day period. The present application sought condonation of that delay.

1. Whether the appellant had shown “sufficient cause” under Section 111(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal against the first and second impugned orders?

2. Whether the appellant’s withdrawal of the earlier appeal and pursuit of clarification proceedings before the Commission constituted forum shopping or otherwise disentitled it from seeking condonation of delay?

3. Whether the liberty granted by the Tribunal while permitting withdrawal of the earlier appeal automatically preserved or extended the limitation period for filing a fresh appeal?

Section 111(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003 requires an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity to be filed within 45 days from receipt of the impugned order, while its proviso permits entertaining an appeal after that period where the appellant demonstrates “sufficient cause”.

The Tribunal applied the principles under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, holding that the applicant must explain the entire period from the commencement of limitation until filing, including both the prescribed period and the subsequent delay, as stated in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 INSC 1104.

It also relied on Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157, and Isha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, for the principles that “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal, pragmatic and justice-oriented interpretation, subject to absence of negligence, lack of bona fides, concoction or gross inaction.

However, following Arifa v. Abhiman Apartment Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., (2025) 10 SCC 700, the Tribunal held that liberty to file a fresh appeal does not automatically suspend, extend or save limitation; limitation continues to apply to the fresh proceeding.

The Tribunal found that the appellant had not remained inactive: it had first filed an appeal against the Commission’s order, participated in the review-related proceedings, filed a clarification petition, withdrew the earlier appeal only after obtaining express liberty to reagitate the issues, and filed the present appeal within 45 days of the dismissal of the clarification petition.

Although the liberty order did not itself save limitation, the appellant had independently explained the circumstances constituting sufficient cause for the delay.

The Tribunal considered the appellant’s conduct bona fide and held that the delay resulted from its pursuit of remedies before the appropriate forums rather than negligence or deliberate inaction.

It rejected the allegation of forum shopping because the appellant could not reasonably continue the earlier appeal and the clarification proceedings simultaneously, and had withdrawn the appeal with the Tribunal’s permission.

The delay, though substantial, was not considered contumacious or incapable of condonation, particularly in light of the liberal and purposive approach mandated by the Supreme Court.

IA No. 595 of 2026 was allowed, and the delay in filing the appeal was condoned subject to payment of costs of ₹50,000 to Respondent No. 2 within two weeks; failure to pay would result in dismissal of the appeal as time-barred.

Replies to the appeal and the interim-relief application were directed to be filed within four weeks, with rejoinder, if any, within two weeks thereafter, and the matter was listed for 28.09.2026.