Prolonged unexplained delay cannot be condoned merely on sympathetic grounds or compassionate appointment claims.

The applicant challenged orders dated 11.06.2019 and 31.07.2019 concerning rejection of his claim for appointment on compassionate grounds.

Since the order dated 31.07.2019 was received by him, the Original Application ought to have been filed within the limitation period under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, by 30.07.2020. However, the O.A. was filed only on 17.10.2024, resulting in a delay of 1,558 days.

For condonation, the applicant relied on the murder of his elder brother in 2015, the criminal trial and alleged fear and depression arising therefrom, his mother’s illness, the disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, his financial difficulties, and the absence of prejudice to third parties.

The respondents opposed the application, contending that the delay remained substantially unexplained even after excluding the period covered by the Supreme Court’s COVID-19 limitation orders. They also pointed out that the applicant had previously approached the Tribunal in O.A. No. 2250/2017 regarding the same compassionate-appointment claim.

Whether the applicant had shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 1,558 days in filing the Original Application challenging the orders dated 11.06.2019 and 31.07.2019.

Whether the applicant’s prior proceedings, subsequent reconsideration of his claim, the COVID-19 pandemic, personal difficulties, and absence of third-party prejudice could extend or revive the limitation period.

The Tribunal applied Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, governing limitation for applications before the Tribunal, along with the principle that delay may be condoned only upon a bona fide, reasonable, and satisfactory explanation covering the entire period of delay.

Relying on H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah (since deceased) by LRs., 2025 INSC 53, the Tribunal held that expressions such as “liberal approach,” “justice-oriented approach,” and “substantial justice” cannot be used to defeat the law of limitation.

P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 was relied upon for the requirement of a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for delay.

Under Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, and State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, consideration of a belated representation or claim does not revive a stale cause of action or create a fresh limitation period.

The COVID-19 period excluded pursuant to the Supreme Court’s orders could be given due benefit, but such exclusion did not dispense with the need to explain the remaining delay.

The Tribunal held that the delay was substantial because the impugned order was dated 31.07.2019, whereas the O.A. was filed only on 17.10.2024.

Although the murder of the applicant’s brother, his alleged depression and fear, his mother’s illness, and the COVID-19 pandemic deserved consideration, the applicant failed to demonstrate that these circumstances continuously prevented him from pursuing the legal remedy throughout the entire period of delay.

In particular, the period between July 2019 and March 2020 remained unexplained, and a substantial period also remained unexplained after accounting for the COVID-19 exclusion.

His prior filing of O.A. No. 2250/2017 demonstrated familiarity with and access to the Tribunal remedy, weakening the claim that he was unable to pursue the subsequent challenge.

The respondents’ later reconsideration of his case did not create a fresh cause of action, and the absence of prejudice to third parties, his financial condition, and the compassionate nature of the claim could not substitute for proof of sufficient cause.

The explanation did not account for the entire period of inaction, particularly the periods before and after the COVID-19 limitation exclusion.

Accordingly, M.A. No. 1141/2025 was dismissed, and the accompanying O.A. No. 556/2025 was dismissed as barred by limitation. No order as to costs was made.