Promotion through LDCE counts as direct recruitment for determining MACP financial upgradations.

The Applicant was appointed as a Group ‘D’ employee on 29 August 1980 and subsequently entered the cadre of Postal Assistant on 16 October 1987 after succeeding in a Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE).

He contended that this appointment was merit-based and could not be treated as a promotion for determining financial upgradations under the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) Scheme.

He was granted the first financial upgradation under the TBOP Scheme on 4 October 2003.

The MACP Scheme was introduced with retrospective effect from 1 September 2008, under which he claimed entitlement to the second financial upgradation from 1 September 2008 and the third financial upgradation upon completing 30 years as a Postal Assistant on 16 October 2017.

Before retirement on 31 January 2018, the Applicant sought the third MACP benefit.

The claim was rejected by the second Respondent by order dated 5 May 2017, principally on the ground that the earlier Tribunal decision relied upon by him operated only in personam.

The Applicant therefore challenged the rejection and sought the second and third MACP benefits with consequential monetary and pensionary benefits.

Whether appointment as Postal Assistant through an LDCE is to be treated as equivalent to direct recruitment, rather than as a promotion, for determining eligibility under the MACP Scheme

Whether the Applicant was entitled to the second financial upgradation from 1 September 2008 and the third financial upgradation from 16 October 2017

The Tribunal applied the MACP Scheme, under which financial upgradation is ordinarily granted upon completion of each prescribed period of regular service, subject to the Scheme’s conditions.

It relied on D. Sivakumar v. Union of India, OA No.1088/2011, where the Tribunal held that advancement through LDCE should not be treated as a promotion for MACP purposes; that decision was upheld by the Madras High Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the Union’s SLP, while leaving the question of law open.

The Tribunal also considered the Department of Posts’ clarification dated 29 September 2021, which acknowledged that the issue remained pending before the Supreme Court.

It further relied on the Supreme Court’s orders dated 24 February 2026 in Union of India v. E. Sreeramulu & Batch and connected matters, by which the appeals/SLPs were dismissed and directions were issued for implementation of the Tribunal orders, including extension of MACP benefits in the concerned case.

The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s entry into the Postal Assistant cadre followed successful participation in an LDCE and was based on merit, not seniority-based promotion.

Since all Group ‘D’ employees were not automatically eligible and appointment depended upon success in the competitive examination, the Tribunal treated the appointment as analogous to direct recruitment for MACP computation.

It considered the earlier D. Sivakumar decision, its affirmation by the High Court, and the subsequent Supreme Court orders concerning the same legal controversy.

Although the Supreme Court had formally left the question of law open, the Tribunal treated the developments and the directions to extend MACP benefits as supporting the Applicant’s claim.

The Respondents were unable to effectively controvert the Applicant’s reliance on those orders.

Accordingly, the rejection order was held unsustainable and the Applicant was found entitled to the claimed financial upgradations.

The Tribunal set aside the impugned order dated 5 May 2017 and directed the Respondents to grant the Applicant the second MACP financial upgradation with effect from 1 September 2008 and the third financial upgradation with effect from 16 October 2017.

The Respondents were also directed to pay consequential arrears of pay and allowances, revise pensionary benefits, and grant all other consequential benefits in accordance with the applicable rules, within three months from receipt of the Tribunal’s order.

There was no order as to costs.