Property inherited by a son from his father after 1956 becomes separate, not coparcenary, property.

The plaintiff was the daughter of Vinodbhai Jashbhai Patel and Shardaben, whose marriage was solemnized on 5 December 1949. During the subsistence of that marriage, Vinodbhai entered into a second marriage with Kalpanaben on 25 June 1973; defendants 1–3 were born from that relationship and were treated as children of a void marriage.

The suit properties originally belonged to Jashbhai Mathurbhai Patel, the plaintiff’s grandfather, and were treated by the parties as his self-acquired properties. Jashbhai died intestate after 1956, whereupon the properties devolved upon his son Vinodbhai under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“HSA”).

Vinodbhai subsequently died intestate on 26 February 2005.

The plaintiff claimed that the properties were ancestral/coparcenary properties and that defendants 1–3, being illegitimate children, had no right or share in them.

The Trial Court declared the plaintiff, defendants 1–3, and defendant 4—the first legally wedded wife of Vinodbhai—entitled to equal one-fifth shares. The First Appellate Court dismissed the plaintiff’s Regular Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2023 and confirmed the decree dated 4 March 2023; the present second appeal was filed under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the suit properties were ancestral/coparcenary properties in which the plaintiff acquired rights by birth, thereby excluding defendants 1–3 from claiming a share.

2. Whether properties inherited by Vinodbhai from his father’s self-acquired estate after 1956 became Vinodbhai’s separate/self-acquired property under Section 8 of the HSA.

3. Whether defendants 1–3, as children born from Vinodbhai’s void second marriage, were entitled to inherit from Vinodbhai’s property upon his intestate death.

4. Whether the appeal raised any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

The Court applied Sections 4, 6 and 8 of the HSA, holding that, after the commencement of the HSA, intestate succession to a Hindu’s property is governed by the statutory scheme and that property inherited by a son from his father’s self-acquired estate under Section 8 is held by the son as his separate/self-acquired property, absent an applicable coparcenary succession.

Section 6 applies to coparcenary property, whereas a grandson or granddaughter does not acquire a birthright in the self-acquired property of a grandfather.

The Court also relied on Sections 5, 11 and 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, treating children born from a void marriage as entitled to inherit from their parents, though not to claim rights in the property of grandparents or other relatives.

Reliance was placed on Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur, Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, CWT v. Chander Sen, Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun, Hemiben Limbabhai Pipariya v. Rasilaben Limbabhai Pipariya, and Nachiketa Kantibhai Patel v. Kantibhai Ishwarbhai Patel, particularly on the distinction between ancestral/coparcenary property and property inherited under Section 8 of the HSA.

The Court further applied the limited scope of second appeals under Section 100 CPC, as recognized in Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth and Jaichand v. Sahnulal.

The Court found that the properties were the self-acquired properties of Jashbhai and that the plaintiff produced no evidence showing that Jashbhai had inherited them from a paternal ancestor.

Since Jashbhai died intestate after 1956, the properties devolved upon Vinodbhai under Section 8 of the HSA and became his separate property; they did not remain ancestral or coparcenary property in the hands of Vinodbhai or the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the plaintiff could not claim a birthright under Section 6.

Upon Vinodbhai’s intestate death, the plaintiff and his first legally wedded wife were entitled to inherit, and defendants 1–3 were also entitled to inherit from Vinodbhai as his children under the law governing children of a void marriage.

The Court therefore upheld the equal one-fifth shares declared by the courts below and found no perversity, gross error of law, or substantial question of law justifying interference in second appeal.

The plaintiff was therefore not exclusively entitled to the properties, and defendants 1–3 were entitled to inherit from Vinodbhai along with the plaintiff and defendant 4.

The Second Appeal was dismissed in limine for want of any substantial question of law; the connected Civil Application for stay was disposed of as infructuous, with no order as to costs.