Pure findings of fact cannot be challenged in second appeal absent a substantial question of law.

The respondents instituted a suit concerning 8 Bighas 17 Lechas of land covered by Periodic Patta No. 45 at Karikhana Bilgaon, Lanka Mouza, Nagaon, claiming ownership through Surendra Sangma, who died in 1976 leaving them as his legal heirs.

The respondents alleged that the appellants had been permitted to remain on the land and look after it, but failed to vacate when demanded on 02.12.2003; they consequently sought declaration of title and recovery of vacant possession.

The appellants denied Surendra Sangma’s ownership, asserting that they had cleared and cultivated the land themselves. They admitted only that Surendra Sangma had been in possession of land covered by Dag No. 6.

The trial court decreed the suit, and the first appellate court affirmed the decree dated 01.11.2013 by judgment dated 30.08.2017.

The Regular Second Appeal was admitted on a substantial question concerning the appellants’ entitlement to hold land situated within a tribal belt and block.

Whether the findings of the courts below that the appellants were not entitled to hold land situated within a tribal belt and block were perverse because the courts did not determine whether the appellants belonged to a reserved category?

Whether the High Court, in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the tribal-belt status of the land and the respondents’ status as members of the Garo Scheduled Tribe?

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which a second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law and does not ordinarily permit reappreciation of evidence or interference with concurrent findings of fact.

Relying on Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, the Court reiterated that a substantial question of law must be debatable, arise from the pleadings and sustainable findings of fact, and materially affect the parties’ rights; a pure question of fact is not a substantial question of law.

The Court further applied the principle that concurrent findings of fact remain immune from interference in second appeal unless shown to be perverse or legally unsustainable.

The evidence before the trial court established that the suit land fell within a tribal belt and block, and that the respondents belonged to the Garo community, which was a notified Scheduled Tribe.

This was supported by the testimony of the Lat Mandal and a certificate issued by the Circle Officer, Lanka.

The High Court held that the question framed in the appeal essentially involved factual matters already determined by both courts below, rather than a debatable question of law.

Since the appellants sought, in substance, reconsideration of the evidence and factual findings, the Court found no permissible basis for interference under Section 100 CPC.

The Regular Second Appeal was therefore dismissed for want of merit, and the trial court record was directed to be sent back.