Purely contractual disputes with the State ordinarily require civil remedies, not writ jurisdiction.

Bartaman Magazines Pvt. Ltd. obtained an unregistered month-to-month lease from the Government of West Bengal in respect of land and a building at Salt Lake, Kolkata.

The lease prohibited sub-letting, assignment, or use of the premises for purposes other than those authorised without the Government’s prior written consent, and permitted re-entry upon breach after notice and an opportunity to remedy the breach.

The lessee subsequently permitted portions of the premises to be occupied by various entities, including Aditya Birla Sun Life Insurance Co. Ltd./Aditya Birla Capital.

The State issued notices dated June 23, 2026 and July 7, 2026 alleging breaches and requiring the lessee to remedy them or vacate the unit occupied by Aditya Birla Capital.

Bartaman Magazines challenged the notices under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging arbitrariness, retaliation for a news publication, threatened forcible entry, and violation of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The learned Single Judge restrained the State from evicting the writ petitioners until September 15, 2026 or until further orders. The State appealed against that interim order.

Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in restraining the State from initiating eviction proceedings or taking steps pursuant to the lease-related notices through an interim order under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Whether the dispute concerning alleged breaches of the lease, sub-letting, use of the premises, and the validity of the notices was essentially contractual and required adjudication through ordinary civil remedies rather than writ jurisdiction?

Whether the notices were invalid for non-compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or the contractual notice requirements?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution, holding that writ jurisdiction ordinarily does not extend to disputes arising purely from non-statutory contractual obligations where no public-law element is involved.

Relying on Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457, the Court stated that contractual breaches between the State and a private party should ordinarily be determined by a civil court.

Under Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293, disputes concerning contractual terms or alleged breaches are governed by ordinary contract law, notwithstanding that one party is a public or statutory body.

The Court also relied on Joshi Technologies International INC. v. Union of India, (2015) 7 SCC 728, particularly the principles that writ jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be used to avoid contractual obligations, that contractual breach generally gives rise to civil remedies, and that Article 226 may nevertheless be invoked where executive action is unlawful, arbitrary, unequal, or violates natural justice in a matter involving a public-law element.

The Court considered Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the contractual restriction against unauthorised sub-letting and use, and the contractual provision requiring notice and an opportunity to remedy breach before re-entry.

The Court found that the dispute arose from the interpretation and enforcement of the lease conditions, particularly the alleged unauthorised sub-letting and use of the premises by Aditya Birla Capital.

The State’s earlier communication dated April 9, 2025 had already required the lessee to take specified corrective steps, and the Court treated that communication as an opportunity to remedy the alleged breaches.

Although the lease and the Transfer of Property Act required compliance with due process, the notices did not authorise forcible entry; they required the lessee to clear the allegedly unauthorised unit.

Whether the notices were legally sufficient, whether the breach occurred, and whether eviction could follow were matters for adjudication in appropriate civil proceedings, not for blanket protection under Article 226 at the interim stage.

The Court therefore held that the Single Judge had placed undue reliance on the pending request for permission and Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act while overlooking the contractual correspondence and alleged breaches.

It held that a blanket injunction against eviction proceedings was unwarranted in a dispute arising principally from a non-statutory lease and alleged contractual breaches.

The State was not authorised to enter the premises forcibly or otherwise act outside due process, but the validity and legal effect of the notices, and the parties’ contractual rights, were left open for determination in appropriate proceedings.

The learned Single Judge was directed to decide the writ petition on its own merits, after exchange of affidavits, in relation to the remaining issues, including the allegation of executive highhandedness or other public-law infirmity.