Rahul Gandhi’s Remarks About Sikhs’ Safety Abroad: Allahabad HC Upholds Refusal To Order FIR, Finds No BNS 152 Offence Made Out

The applicants sought, under Section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), an order directing registration of an FIR and investigation against Rahul Gandhi under Sections 147, 148 and 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).

They alleged that, during a visit abroad, he had questioned whether Sikhs in India could safely wear turbans or visit gurdwaras, and claimed that the speech could encourage separatism and threaten national unity.

The Magistrate rejected the application, finding no cognizable offence disclosed; the revisional court affirmed that decision.

The applicants challenged both orders under Section 528 BNSS.

They argued that the speech constituted an offence under Section 152 BNS and relied on newspaper reports and an alleged admission in an earlier proceeding.

Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression, subject to the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2).

Under Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, mere discussion or advocacy is protected; the restriction on speech becomes relevant when it reaches incitement.

Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh describes the breadth of protected expression across different forms and media.

Relying on Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, the Court emphasized judicial protection of freedom of expression and the need to ascertain whether a prima facie case exists before criminal proceedings are pursued over speech.

Section 152 BNS criminalizes purposeful or knowing speech or other conduct that excites or attempts to excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, encourages separatist activities, or endangers India’s sovereignty, unity or integrity; criticism of government action by lawful means, without such incitement, is excluded.

The Court also applied its stated approach in Simran Gupta v. State of U.P.: a person seeking prosecution over speech must provide material particulars showing both that the statutory offence is prima facie made out and that the speech is not protected by Article 19(1)(a).

The Court treated the alleged remarks, on their face, as raising concerns about a section of society rather than inciting violence or disturbing public order; an elected representative was entitled to raise such concerns, and disagreement with the remarks did not make them criminal.

The applicants did not provide material particulars showing that the speech excited or attempted to excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activity, encouraged separatism, or endangered India’s sovereignty, unity or integrity.

The Court also noted the absence of the speech’s date, time and place, the complete speech extract, and evidence that it had resulted in any harm covered by Section 152.

The alleged endorsement or appropriation of the remarks by a third party did not, without supporting circumstances, establish that the speaker had committed the offence.

Concluding that suspicion alone could not justify prosecution and that the speech remained protected expression on the material presented, the Court found no basis to interfere with the concurrent orders below.

It dismissed the application under Section 528 BNSS and declined to interfere with the Magistrate’s order rejecting the request for an FIR and the revisional court’s order affirming it.