### Registrar of Firms Lacks Statutory Power to Cancel or Review Partnership Registration Under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Petitioner No. 1 is a partnership firm originally registered on 08.05.2006 based on a deed between Petitioner Nos. 2 and 4 dated 01.01.2006.

Although a supplementary deed inducting Petitioner No. 3 was executed on 17.02.2006, and an amended deed reflecting Petitioner No. 4’s resignation was prepared on 31.03.2006, these changes were only notified to the Registrar in 2010 via "Form V".

Respondent No. 5 (a private party) filed a complaint alleging fraud, asserting that Petitioner No. 4 could not have signed for registration in April 2006 if she had resigned in March 2006.

Consequently, Respondent No. 3 (Deputy Commissioner, Industries) cancelled the firm's registration on 17.02.2014, citing concealment of facts and a "void ab initio" registration.

A review application was dismissed by the Registrar of Firms on 05.01.2015.

Whether the Registrar of Firms or the Deputy Commissioner has the statutory power under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, to cancel or set aside a Certificate of Registration.

Whether Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, can be invoked to rescind a registration certificate in the absence of an express provision in the Partnership Act.

Whether the initial registration was obtained by "fraud" or "misrepresentation" sufficient to render it void.

The Court applied Section 57 of the Indian Partnership Act (IPA), 1932, regarding the appointment of Registrars, and Section 59 regarding the recording of registration.

It strictly interpreted Section 64 of the IPA, which limits the Registrar's power to the "rectification of mistakes" to bring entries into conformity with filed documents.

The Court followed the principle from *Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. v. CIT* that quasi-judicial orders cannot be recalled using Section 21 of the General Clauses Act (GCA) without express statutory authority.

It further distinguished administrative "orders" from "acknowledgments of statements" under the IPA, noting that Section 21 GCA applies only to the former.

Finally, it applied the standard for "fraud in public law" from *Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Brothers*, stating that non-disclosure of a fact not required by statute does not constitute fraud.

The Court reasoned that the Deputy Commissioner (Respondent No. 3) usurped the Registrar's jurisdiction, as the IPA and relevant notifications designate the SDM (Headquarter) as the "Registrar," not the Deputy Commissioner.

It held that the Registrar’s duties under Rules 6, 7, and 9 of the Delhi Partnership Rules, 1972, characterize the function as "quasi-judicial" when disputes arise, thereby precluding the use of Section 21 of the GCA to rescind registration.

The Court found that Section 64 of the IPA provides only for rectification, not cancellation.

Regarding the allegation of fraud, the Court observed that Petitioner No. 4’s resignation was not "acted upon" or "tendered" at the time of initial registration in 2006; therefore, the declaration made in the original "Form I" was not a misrepresentation of the then-active partnership.

The court emphasized that the subsequent filing of "Form V" in 2010 was a voluntary disclosure, not a "colourable transaction" to evade the law.

The Court quashed the impugned orders dated 17.02.2014 and 05.01.2015 and directed the restoration of the Registration Certificate of Petitioner No. 1.

It concluded that any dispute regarding the validity of partnership deeds must be adjudicated by a Civil Court, not an administrative body.

The writ petition is allowed.