Reverse Onus Presumption Under POCSO Operates Only After Prosecution Proves Foundational Facts Including Penetration

The Appellant was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 376(2)(i) IPC and Sections 5(m), 5(n) r/w Section 6 of the POCSO Act for the alleged sexual assault of a five-year-old girl on 07.09.2017.

The prosecution alleged that the Appellant took the victim to a terrace, stripped her, and performed "dirty things" resulting in bleeding.

The medical examination conducted ten hours later found no external or internal injuries, an intact hymen, and no signs of bleeding or sperm.

The victim’s allegation of "bleeding" appeared only in her Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement recorded two months after the incident, and was absent from her initial police statement and her testimony before the Trial Court.

The Trial Court relied on the statutory presumption under Section 29 POCSO Act to convict.

The Court applied Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act regarding statutory presumptions, emphasizing that they are "reverse-onus" provisions that require the prosecution to first prove "foundational facts" beyond reasonable doubt before the burden shifts.

The Court relied on Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Gorakh Nath Prasad v. State of Bihar to establish that suspicion cannot substitute proof and that reverse-onus provisions must be strictly construed.

Regarding inconsistency, it applied the principle from Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana and Kapildeo Mandal v. State of Bihar that medical evidence prevails if it completely excludes the possibility of the ocular account being true.

The Court applied the test of a "sterling witness" from Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) to evaluate the consistency of the victim’s testimony.

The Court observed that the Trial Court erroneously invoked Section 29 POCSO Act to convict for a non-POCSO offense (Sec 376(2)(i) IPC) and to impose a sentence (life for remainder of natural life) that was not available under the version of POCSO applicable at the time of the offense.

Analytically, the High Court found that "penetration" was never specifically alleged by the victim in court, but merely inferred from the claim of "bleeding".

This claim was directly belied by the medical report which showed zero injuries.

The Court found the two-month delay in recording the Section 164 statement and the omission of bleeding in the initial statement as indicators of subsequent tutoring.

Consequently, the victim did not qualify as a "sterling witness" regarding penetration.

The Court refused to discard the entire testimony, applying the rule that the grain must be separated from the chaff; while penetration was unproven, the acts of taking the child to the terrace and touching her genital area with sexual intent were established.

The Court held that while the foundational facts for "penetrative sexual assault" were not proved, the ingredients for "aggravated sexual assault" under Section 7 r/w Sections 9(m) and 9(n) of the POCSO Act were established.

The Appellant was convicted under Section 10 of the POCSO Act and sentenced to the period already undergone (five years and eight months) and a fine of Rs. 50,000/-.