Revisional jurisdiction cannot substitute the Rent Controller’s plausible findings by reappreciating evidence.

The Petitioners-tenants challenged, under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the order dated 24 December 2025 by which the learned ARC dismissed their application for leave to defend in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) and directed their eviction from a ground-floor shop measuring approximately 7 × 30 feet, along with a wooden parchhati, at Property No. 5602, Gandhi Market, Sadar Bazar, Delhi.

The Respondent-landlord claimed bona fide requirement of the premises to start an artificial-jewellery business for her livelihood.

The Petitioners alleged that the requirement was not bona fide because the Respondent was financially well-off, was associated with a guest house, had sold several properties, and had numerous alternative properties available to her.

The ARC rejected these objections, finding that the Petitioners had failed to produce sufficient material showing the availability and suitability of alternative accommodation or disproving the bona fide requirement.

Whether the ARC failed to consider the Petitioners’ specific allegations regarding the Respondent’s ownership, possession, and availability of numerous alternative properties, thereby raising a triable issue requiring grant of leave to defend?

Whether the Respondent’s alleged financial position, association with a guest house, and prior sale of properties rendered her pleaded requirement to commence an artificial-jewellery business non-bona fide?

Whether the impugned order disclosed perversity, material irregularity, jurisdictional error, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act?

The Court applied Section 14(1)(e) and the summary procedure under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.

A landlord’s bona fide requirement is presumed once the landlord places prima facie material and adequate pleadings before the Rent Controller; however, the presumption may be rebutted by the tenant through material of sufficient substance disclosing a genuine triable issue, and a mere assertion is insufficient, as held in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30.

Alternative accommodation must be both available to the landlord and reasonably suitable for the pleaded requirement; the landlord is generally the best judge of the premises required, and the tenant cannot dictate the manner in which the landlord should utilise available premises.

Under the proviso to Section 25-B(8), the High Court exercises limited supervisory and revisional jurisdiction—not appellate jurisdiction—and may interfere only for jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, absence of adjudication, or an error apparent on the face of the record; it cannot substitute its own view merely because another view is possible, as explained in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-Ul-Islam.

The Court also relied on Raghunath C. Panhale v. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. for the principle that a landlord need not wait until starvation before commencing a business, and on Section 19 of the DRC Act, which protects a dispossessed tenant where the landlord fails to use the premises for the stated purpose.

The Court held that the ARC had not proceeded merely on the Respondent’s pleadings.

It had expressly considered the objections concerning the Respondent’s financial position, the Metro Guest House, the properties sold before institution of the eviction petition, and the numerous properties alleged to constitute alternative accommodation.

The Petitioners’ assertions regarding the Respondent’s financial capability and alleged lack of necessity were unsupported by adequate material and therefore did not constitute a triable issue.

The guest house was already being operated by the Respondent’s brother-in-law under a licence, and the Petitioners produced no prima facie material establishing that the premises were solely owned or controlled by the Respondent or were available for her proposed business.

The prior sales of properties between 2021 and 2024 did not, by themselves, disprove the Respondent’s present requirement pleaded in 2025.

Regarding the extensive list of properties, the ARC had considered the Respondent’s explanation that the properties were either owned by her deceased husband, occupied by tenants, or jointly owned/relinquished, and correctly required the Petitioners to show prima facie availability and reasonable suitability.

Since the Petitioners essentially sought reappreciation of the same material and substitution of the ARC’s plausible view, the limited revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) was not attracted.

It held that the ARC had duly considered the relevant objections and that the Petitioners failed to disclose any genuine triable issue concerning the Respondent’s bona fide requirement or the availability of reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

No perversity, material irregularity, jurisdictional error, or error apparent on the face of the record was established.

The revision petition was accordingly dismissed, and the pending application, if any, was also disposed of.