Right to life includes the right to timely and adequate medical treatment of one's choice.

The petitioner, a 68-year-old prisoner undergoing a four-year sentence affirmed by the High Court and Supreme Court, suffers from gangrene.

Following the amputation of a toe at a government hospital, doctors advised that the infection had spread, potentially requiring leg amputation.

Apprehensive of the treatment quality, the petitioner applied for 90 days of parole under the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989, to seek treatment at a private hospital at his own expense.

Despite the urgency, the District Magistrate (Respondent No. 3) failed to decide on the application forwarded by jail authorities.

The petitioner approached the High Court alleging a violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution due to administrative inaction.

Whether the state’s inaction in deciding a medical parole application violates the fundamental right to life and medical care under Article 21 of the Constitution.

Whether the competent authority is under a statutory obligation to decide parole applications within a reasonable time when founded on serious medical grounds.

The court primarily applied Rules 4, 6, 9, 11, and 12 of the Chhattisgarh Prisoner’s Leave Rules, 1989, which govern the conditions, sanctioning authority, and procedures for granting leave to prisoners.

It relied on the constitutional principle that the right to life under Article 21 encompasses the right to timely and adequate medical treatment.

Furthermore, the court referenced Shor v. State of U.P. (WP(Cr.) No. 58/2020), clarifying that parole should not be denied solely on the heinous nature of the crime if the prisoner's conduct and circumstances warrant release under statutory provisions.

The Court reasoned that while parole is not an absolute right and is subject to administrative satisfaction, the authorities are bound by a statutory obligation to act within a reasonable timeframe, especially in medical emergencies.

The Court observed that the petitioner’s deteriorating condition (gangrene and risk of further amputation) warranted urgent attention.

The bench determined that administrative apathy or "inaction" in health-related matters constitutes a failure of legal duty.

By linking the statutory framework of the 1989 Rules with the constitutional mandates of Article 21, the Court found that the pending status of the application, despite the evident medical crisis, necessitated judicial intervention to ensure a reasoned decision was rendered.

Without ruling on the merits of the parole claim itself, the Court disposed of the petition by directing the competent authority to decide the pending application strictly in accordance with the law.

The authority was ordered to pass a reasoned and speaking order within 10 days of receiving the court’s order.