Rule 16.38 concurrence is unnecessary for departmental proceedings based solely on custodial negligence.

Rajinder Singh, an Assistant Sub-Inspector posted at Police Post No. 2, Police Station Kotwali, Faridabad, apprehended three persons during investigation of a theft complaint. Two of them escaped from custody, while one, Mustaq Ali, was arrested. A departmental inquiry was initiated against him for negligence and dereliction of duty. He was found guilty and, by order dated 24.12.2003, punished with stoppage of two future annual increments with permanent effect. The punishment was reduced in revision by the Director General of Police, Haryana, on 27.09.2004, to stoppage of one increment with permanent effect; his subsequent mercy petition was rejected

The respondent challenged the punishment by filing a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction, contending that the inquiry violated Rules 16.24 and 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, particularly because no concurrence of the District Magistrate had been obtained. The Trial Court decreed the suit, set aside the punishment, restrained recovery, and directed payment of arrears and restoration of seniority. The First Appellate Court affirmed the decree on 16.02.2012. The State consequently filed the present regular second appeal

1. Whether Rule 16.38(1) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, applied to departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent for negligence in allowing apprehended persons to escape from custody?

2. Whether concurrence of the District Magistrate was mandatory before initiating the departmental inquiry?

3. Whether the Courts below were justified in holding that the inquiry was vitiated for want of such concurrence?

4. If the punishment was otherwise sustainable, whether stoppage of one increment with permanent effect was disproportionate and ought to operate without cumulative effect?

Rule 16.38(1) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, requires concurrence of the District Magistrate where a preliminary inquiry or investigation into a complaint establishes a prima facie case of a criminal offence by an enrolled police officer in connection with his official relations with the public, but the Superintendent of Police proposes departmental proceedings instead of the normally contemplated judicial prosecution

The Court relied on Vijaypal v. State of Haryana, 2023 NCPHHC 124239, holding that Rule 16.38 does not apply to internal departmental action for negligence in preventing an accused’s escape where no criminal case or judicial prosecution is involved

It also referred to Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, which held that applicability of Rule 16.38 depends upon the existence of a prima facie criminal offence connected with the officer’s official relations with the public

On proportionality of punishment, the Court applied Union of India v. Ex-Constable Ram Karan, 2022 (1) SCC 373, under which courts ordinarily remit the matter to the disciplinary authority when punishment is disproportionate, but may themselves modify the penalty in rare cases to shorten protracted litigation

The Court exercised its power under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to modify the punishment

The Court held that Rule 16.38(1) contains two cumulative requirements: a complaint alleging commission of a criminal offence by the police officer and a connection between that offence and the officer’s official relations with the public

Neither requirement was satisfied. The respondent was not accused of committing a criminal offence against Raj Kumar or any other member of the public; the charge was only that he negligently failed to prevent two apprehended persons from escaping during a theft investigation. The matter arose from an internal departmental assessment of dereliction of duty, no criminal case was registered, and no judicial prosecution was contemplated

Accordingly, the District Magistrate’s concurrence was not required, and the Courts below erred in treating its absence as fatal to the inquiry

However, considering that more than two decades had elapsed, the solitary nature of the lapse, the prolonged litigation, and the excessive cumulative effect of the punishment, the Court found it appropriate to modify the penalty rather than remand the matter to the disciplinary authority

The judgments and decrees of the Courts below were therefore set aside, and the order dated 27.09.2004 was restored. Nevertheless, exercising power under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, the Court modified the punishment from stoppage of one increment with permanent effect to stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect. The respondent’s consequential benefits were directed to be reassessed and released within three months, together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of accrual until realization