Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act cannot be weaponized against persons through adversarial litigation.

The Appellant, son of Respondent No. 1, had instituted a partition suit in 2015 claiming his share in ancestral coparcenary properties.

In December 2025, he filed Interim Application No. 7713 of 2025 seeking a direction under Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 (“MHA, 2017”) for Respondent No. 1 to be examined by an independent Medical Board, alleging that Respondent No. 1 suffered from mental illness.

The learned Single Judge rejected the application, holding that the material disclosed only temporary and reversible symptoms arising from a metabolic condition and that the application appeared to be an attempt to use Section 105 as a litigation strategy.

The Appellant challenged that order in the present appeal.

The Division Bench also noted that the medical certificate had been available earlier, that the Appellant had not raised the issue of mental instability in prior proceedings, and that the application was filed after earlier proceedings had been heard and reserved for orders.

Whether the learned Single Judge ought to have directed Respondent No. 1 to undergo examination by a Medical Board under Section 105 of the MHA, 2017 merely because the record referred to hypoglycaemic episodes and cognitive symptoms?

Whether the symptoms recorded in the medical certificate constituted “mental illness” within the meaning of Section 2(1)(s) of the MHA, 2017?

Whether Section 105 of the MHA, 2017 could be invoked by an adversarial litigant in pending proceedings where the application was found to be a litigation tactic and an abuse of process?

Whether the discretionary order of the learned Single Judge disclosed arbitrariness, perversity, or disregard of settled legal principles warranting appellate interference?

Whether the Appellant’s conduct justified dismissal of the appeal with exemplary costs?

The Court applied Section 105 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, concerning reference to the concerned Board where proof of mental illness arises during judicial proceedings and is challenged; however, it held that the provision is intended as a protective mechanism for persons with mental illness and cannot be used as a weapon by an adversarial party.

It applied the definition of “mental illness” under Section 2(1)(s), which requires a substantial and persistent disorder affecting areas such as thinking, mood, perception, memory, judgment, behaviour, recognition of reality, or the ability to meet ordinary demands of life.

The Court relied on S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, for the principle that a litigant approaching the court without clean hands and relying on falsehood or abuse of process is not entitled to relief.

It further relied on Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, and Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, (2024) 11 SCC 351, for the rule that an appellate court should not substitute its discretion for that of the court of first instance unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or contrary to settled principles.

The imposition of realistic and exemplary costs was supported by Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249.

The Court held that the medical certificate described hypoglycaemic episodes following insulin administration, producing temporary symptoms such as confusion, forgetfulness, delusions and perspiration, which resolved when normal blood glucose levels were restored.

Such episodic and reversible symptoms, in the Court’s view, did not prima facie satisfy the statutory requirement of a substantial and persistent mental disorder under Section 2(1)(s) of the MHA, 2017.

The Court therefore found no basis to compel a Medical Board examination under Section 105.

It also considered the timing and surrounding circumstances: the medical certificate was available earlier, the Appellant had not raised mental instability in prior proceedings, and the application was filed after an earlier matter had been heard and reserved for orders.

These circumstances supported the conclusion that the application was an afterthought intended to subject the aged Respondent No. 1 to further litigation and pressure.

Since the Single Judge’s decision was reasoned and not perverse, the appellate court found no ground for interference under the governing principles of appellate review.

The Court upheld the refusal to refer Respondent No. 1 to a Medical Board under Section 105 of the MHA, 2017, holding that the transient, metabolically induced symptoms recorded in the medical certificate did not, prima facie, amount to “mental illness” under Section 2(1)(s).

The Court further held that the application constituted an abuse of process and imposed exemplary costs of ₹5,00,000 on the Appellant, payable to Respondent No. 1, to compensate for the undue harassment caused to him.