Section 125(4) bars maintenance where a wife voluntarily lives separately without sufficient reason.

The applicant and respondent No. 2 were married on 08.06.2021.

The applicant left the matrimonial home on 14.08.2021, and the parties executed a deed of divorce by mutual consent on 16.08.2021.

Thereafter, the applicant filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking maintenance from her husband, alleging harassment and ill-treatment by him and his family members.

The husband denied the allegations, contending that the applicant had voluntarily left the matrimonial home and was living in adultery, thereby attracting the bar under Section 125(4) CrPC.

The Family Court, Bhavnagar rejected the maintenance claim, finding that the applicant had not proved cruelty or ill-treatment, had voluntarily left the matrimonial home, and was living in adultery.

The applicant challenged that order in revision under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC.

1. Whether the Family Court erred in rejecting the applicant’s claim for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC on the ground that she had voluntarily left the matrimonial home without sufficient reason and that the parties were living separately by mutual consent?

2. Whether the findings of the Family Court were perverse, legally erroneous, or otherwise liable to interference in the High Court’s limited revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC?

3. Whether the validity and legal effect of the divorce deed dated 16.08.2021 required independent adjudication in the revision proceedings?

The Court applied Section 125 CrPC, which provides a summary remedy intended to prevent destitution and vagrancy, subject to the statutory restrictions in Section 125(4), including where the wife is living in adultery, refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, or the parties are living separately by mutual consent.

Proceedings under Section 125 are governed by the civil standard of proof, namely, preponderance of probabilities, rather than proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452, the Supreme Court held that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and cannot be equated with appellate or second-appellate jurisdiction; ordinarily, the High Court should not reappreciate evidence unless necessary to prevent gross miscarriage of justice.

In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, the Supreme Court recognised that revision may be exercised for palpable error, non-compliance with law, an entirely erroneous decision, or arbitrary exercise of discretion.

The High Court held that the Family Court had assessed the oral and documentary evidence and had reasonably found that the applicant failed to establish the alleged cruelty or harassment.

The applicant’s departure from the matrimonial home, followed within two days by execution of the divorce deed, supported the finding that the parties had mutually decided to live separately.

The Court therefore found that the applicant had not shown sufficient reason for residing separately, attracting the statutory restriction under Section 125(4) CrPC.

It clarified that failure to prove cruelty does not automatically disentitle a wife from maintenance; the determination must depend on the evidence in each case.

Since the Family Court’s findings were based on evidence and were neither perverse nor manifestly unreasonable, a fresh reappreciation of evidence was impermissible in revision.

The High Court also declined to independently determine the validity of the divorce deed, observing that the rejection of maintenance rested principally on the factual findings attracting Section 125(4).

It held that no patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity was established in the Family Court’s order rejecting maintenance.

The Criminal Revision Application was accordingly rejected, and the Family Court’s judgment dated 21.04.2023 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 504 of 2021 was confirmed.

The rule was discharged and any interim relief was vacated; the Court clarified that its observations were confined to the revision proceedings and would not affect other independent proceedings between the parties.