Section 29(2) revision cannot reappreciate concurrent factual findings absent perversity or gross legal error.

The original landlord, Haribhai Rudabhai Thumbar, instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 185 of 2007 through his son and special power-of-attorney holder, Dineshbhai, seeking eviction of the defendants’ predecessor from a shop let out in 1965.

The suit was founded, inter alia, on the ground under Section 13 of the Gujarat Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required for the betterment and settlement of the landlord’s son and grandsons.

During the suit, the original landlord died and his legal heirs, along with the power-of-attorney holder, were brought on record.

The Trial Court decreed eviction on 29.06.2019, and the Appellate Court dismissed Regular Civil Appeal No. 46 of 2019 on 10.07.2026, affirming the decree.

The tenant-defendants challenged both decisions under Section 29(2) of the Rent Act.

The petitioners contended that the power-of-attorney holder’s evidence could not establish the landlord’s bona fide requirement and that alternative accommodation was available behind the rented shop.

The Court applied Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay/Gujarat Rent Act, under which eviction may be ordered where the premises are “reasonably and bona fide required” by the landlord for his own occupation or the occupation of a family member.

Relying on Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by LRs v. Chaganlal Sundarji & Co., (1999) 8 SCC 1, the Court held that “reasonable requirement” means something more than a mere desire, though it need not amount to an absolute or compelling necessity, and that “bona fide” denotes an honest requirement free from an oblique motive.

Under Section 29(2), revisional jurisdiction is limited: as explained in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence merely because another view is possible, but may interfere where the finding is perverse, based on no evidence, founded on misreading or non-consideration of material evidence, or is so grossly erroneous as to cause a miscarriage of justice.

The Court found that the landlord had five sons and two grandsons, that Dineshbhai—the special power-of-attorney holder—resided above the rented shop and conducted an electrical-appliance agency nearby, and that the existing shop was insufficient for expansion of his business and for the proposed business activities of the grandsons.

Applying the standard that bona fide requirement is more than a fanciful desire but need not be a dire necessity, the Court held that the requirement proved before the Courts below was genuine and not merely speculative.

The objection to the power-of-attorney holder’s testimony was rejected because it had not been pressed before the lower Courts, no issue had been framed on it, and the holder, being the landlord’s son and a nearby occupant and businessman, possessed direct knowledge of the relevant circumstances.

The plea of alternative accommodation was likewise rejected because it had not been raised or proved before the lower Courts and involved factual appreciation, making it impermissible as a new plea in revision.

The concurrent findings were therefore neither perverse nor legally defective within the narrow scope of Section 29(2).

The Civil Revision Application was dismissed in limine as meritless, and no order was made as to costs.