Section 311 CrPC empowers courts to reopen defence evidence when necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The respondent-complainant instituted a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act concerning a cheque allegedly issued by the petitioner, which was dishonoured.

After completion of the complainant’s evidence and recording of the petitioner’s statement under Section 313 CrPC, the matter was fixed for defence evidence. The petitioner repeatedly remained absent, resulting in the issuance of non-bailable warrants on more than one occasion.

On 18.03.2025, the petitioner’s then-counsel submitted for closure of the defence evidence, and the trial court accordingly closed it.

The petitioner subsequently engaged new counsel and applied for recall of the order dated 18.03.2025, asserting that the earlier counsel had sought closure without instructions and that denial of defence evidence would seriously prejudice his defence.

The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup (Metro), rejected the application on 23.03.2026, finding that the petitioner had deliberately avoided the proceedings and was attempting to delay the trial. The petitioner challenged that order in revision.

1. Whether the trial court was justified in refusing to permit the petitioner to adduce defence evidence after the defence evidence had been closed due to his repeated absence?

2. Whether the criminal court could invoke Section 311 CrPC to secure the petitioner’s opportunity to lead defence evidence, notwithstanding the objection that recalling the closure order would amount to an impermissible review?

3. Whether, in the interests of a fair trial, one final opportunity should be granted subject to appropriate conditions and costs?

Section 311 CrPC confers a wide power on a criminal court, at any stage of an inquiry or trial, to summon, examine, recall or re-examine a person where the evidence appears essential to the just decision of the case.

In Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2013) 14 SCC 461, and the authorities discussed therein, including Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, U.T. of Dadra and Nagar Haveli v. Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan, Iddar v. Aabida and P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., the Supreme Court held that Section 311 may be exercised at any stage, including after closure of evidence, when necessary for a just decision.

The right to a fair opportunity to defend is a fundamental component of a fair criminal trial, and in a prosecution under the Negotiable Instruments Act, defence evidence may be especially significant because the complainant benefits from statutory presumptions.

Although a criminal court has no general power of review, exercise of Section 311 is an independent statutory power and does not constitute review of the earlier order.

The High Court acknowledged that the petitioner had been seriously remiss: he repeatedly failed to appear, appeared only after issuance of non-bailable warrants, and had already caused delay in the proceedings.

Nevertheless, complete denial of defence evidence would effectively leave the prosecution’s case unrebutted and would undermine the fairness of the trial, particularly in a cheque-dishonour prosecution involving statutory presumptions.

The Court also accepted that, where counsel lacked instructions, the more appropriate course would ordinarily have been withdrawal from the case rather than seeking closure of such an important part of the accused’s defence.

Treating the petitioner’s application as one invoking the Court’s power under Section 311 CrPC, the High Court held that the absence of an express citation of that provision was not decisive and that defence evidence could be permitted where essential for a just adjudication.

Balancing the petitioner’s right to a fair trial against the complainant’s prejudice and the delay attributable to the petitioner, the Court granted only one final, tightly time-bound opportunity subject to payment of costs.

The High Court set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 23.03.2026 and directed the trial court to record the petitioner’s defence evidence, if offered, subject to payment of Rs. 10,000 as costs to the complainant before such evidence is recorded.

Both parties were directed to appear before the trial court within seven days, and the defence evidence was to be completed within fourteen days from their appearance.

No further opportunity was to be granted to the petitioner beyond that period, while any adjournment sought by the complainant was to be considered on its merits.