Section 6(2)(b) does not bar CGST proceedings initiated before corresponding SGST proceedings.

The Petitioners challenged the order dated 11 January 2025 passed under the CGST Act and sought quashing of the consequential proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.

The Respondents stated that a search of the Petitioners’ premises was conducted on 3 February 2020, during which certain goods allegedly without invoices were seized.

Proceedings relating to the seized goods were initiated under Section 67(7) of the CGST Act and were dropped by order dated 6 September 2022.

Subsequently, the CGST authorities issued a notice under Section 74 on 22 March 2023 concerning Financial Years 2017–18 to 2021–22, alleging wrongful availment of input tax credit and tax evasion.

After the Petitioners filed their reply, the adjudicating authority passed the impugned order dated 11 January 2025.

The Petitioners also relied on notices and orders issued by the SGST authorities for Financial Years 2017–18 to 2019–20, contending that the CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b).

The High Court noted that an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act was available against the impugned order.

Whether the CGST proceedings were barred by Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act because the SGST authorities had initiated proceedings on the same subject matter.

Whether the order dated 6 September 2022 concerning seized goods and the order dated 11 January 2025 passed after investigation and adjudication constituted parallel adjudication of the same subject matter.

Whether the High Court should exercise writ jurisdiction despite the availability of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107, on the ground that the Petitioners raised pure questions of law or jurisdiction.

Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act provides that where a proper officer under the State GST law has initiated proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under the CGST Act on the same subject matter.

Section 107 provides a statutory appeal against an adjudication order under the CGST Act.

The Court applied the principle that the existence of an alternative remedy does not absolutely bar writ jurisdiction, but the decision to entertain a writ petition remains a matter of judicial discretion, particularly where no clear jurisdictional infirmity is established.

The Court considered Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise & Taxation Officer, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 95, and Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1700, but found them inapplicable on the facts.

The Court held that the CGST notice under Section 74 was issued on 22 March 2023, whereas the earliest SGST notice relied upon by the Petitioners was issued only on 25 September 2023.

Therefore, the SGST proceedings did not precede the CGST proceedings so as to attract the bar under Section 6(2)(b).

The Court also distinguished the earlier order dated 6 September 2022, observing that it concerned proceedings relating specifically to goods seized during the search, whereas the impugned order followed a broader investigation, a Section 74 notice, and consideration of the Petitioners’ reply concerning alleged wrongful input-tax-credit availment and tax evasion.

Since the jurisdictional objection did not disclose a fundamental infirmity and an effective appeal under Section 107 was available, the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction.

The mere assertion that the matter involved pure questions of law did not justify bypassing the statutory remedy.

The writ petition was accordingly disposed of, with the Petitioners relegated to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act.

The period spent prosecuting the writ petition was directed to be excluded while computing the limitation period for filing the appeal.

The pending application was also closed.