01Facts
The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, alleging an agreement to purchase immovable property co-owned by the appellant and her brother.
¶ 1–9The Trial Court restrained the defendants from alienating or creating third-party interests in the property pending disposal of the suit.
¶ 1–9The appellant, the sister and co-owner, challenged that order, denying that she had authorised or entered into any agreement and disputing the reliance on email and WhatsApp printouts, the absence of a written contract, and the non-payment of earnest money.
¶ 1–9The plaintiff relied on the parties’ communications and offered to deposit the agreed advance of Rs. 6 lakh if directed.
¶ 14–1902Issues
i.Whether the email and WhatsApp communications could be considered at the temporary-injunction stage despite the alleged non-compliance with Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
¶ 24–27ii.Whether the communications disclosed a concluded contract sufficient to support an injunction, notwithstanding the absence of a formal written agreement or payment of earnest money.
¶ 28–35, 44–51iii.Whether the Trial Court’s injunction was justified on the principles governing interim relief.
¶ 36–43, 56–5803Law Applied
Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 governs the admissibility of electronic records when they are tendered in evidence; the Court held that its compliance need not be determined at the preliminary stage of an injunction application.
¶ 24–27Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 sets out the requirements for a valid contract and does not generally require an agreement to be in writing, subject to laws that specifically impose a writing, witnessing or registration requirement.
¶ 32–34The Court also relied on the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 concerning use of an unregistered document as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance.
¶ 52The Court further considered the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, holding that it removed the statute’s former discretionary character where the requirements for specific performance are otherwise established.
¶ 37–39Provisions in the judgment · 2 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Indian Contract Act, 1872 Section 10
Registration Act, 1908 Section 49
04Reasoning
The Court held that deciding Section 65B compliance at the injunction stage would improperly convert that hearing into a trial; the communications could therefore be considered provisionally, without determining their ultimate admissibility.
¶ 24–27The emails and related communications—including a draft agreement, the stated price of Rs. 66 lakh, the plaintiff’s acceptance, and a subsequent communication declining to proceed—prima facie showed agreement on essential terms.
¶ 44–51The later refusal did not undo the agreement already reached.
¶ 44–51The absence of a formal written agreement was not fatal, and the Court treated payment of earnest money as following formation of the contract; it also regarded the plaintiff’s offer to deposit Rs. 6 lakh as evidence of readiness and willingness at this stage.
¶ 28–34Unlike Ambalal Sarabhai, the record disclosed no subsequent third-party rights or comparable change of position.
¶ 36–43, 56–58The Court therefore found a prima facie case, with the balance of convenience and risk of irreparable injury also favouring preservation of the property.
¶ 36–43, 56–5805Holding
The appeal was dismissed on contest, and the Trial Court’s injunction restraining alienation or creation of third-party interests was affirmed.
¶ 60The connected application was disposed of; the Trial Court may, if appropriate during the suit, direct the plaintiff to deposit the agreed advance of Rs. 6 lakh, subject to the suit’s outcome.
¶ 61–62The Court clarified that its observations were tentative and would not bind the Trial Court at later stages; there was no order as to costs.
¶ 63–64Original Court PDF
KEYA KUNDUvsPARAG MUKHERJEE AND ORS.
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