01Facts
The appellants instituted proceedings under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), along with an application seeking leave to institute a suit concerning the management and affairs of the respondent public charitable trust.
¶ 4Pending consideration of the leave application, the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mandya, appointed an ad hoc committee comprising the existing trustees under Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC to manage the trust’s day-to-day affairs.
¶ 4The Karnataka High Court set aside that order, holding that a Section 92 suit is “stillborn” until leave is granted and that the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders during the pendency of the leave application.
¶ 4The appellants challenged the High Court’s decision before the Supreme Court.
¶ 402Issues
i.Whether a Civil Court seized of a plaint under Section 92 CPC and an accompanying application for leave may pass protective or preservatory interim orders before leave to institute the suit is granted?
¶ 2ii.Whether the Court may appoint a receiver under Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1(a), or invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, during the pendency of the Section 92 leave application?
¶ 5–17, 39–50iii.Whether, in cases of compelling urgency, notice to the proposed defendants may be dispensed with before granting leave under Section 92 CPC?
¶ 57–6003Law Applied
Section 92 CPC requires persons instituting a representative suit concerning an alleged breach or administration of a public charitable or religious trust to have obtained the Court’s leave before instituting the suit; this requirement is mandatory and operates as a safeguard against vexatious litigation.
¶ 30–34, 43Sections 26 and Order IV CPC ordinarily contemplate institution of a suit through presentation of a plaint, but a Section 92 suit does not come into existence until leave is granted.
¶ 28–31, 35–38Section 94 CPC and Order XL Rule 1(a) CPC authorise supplemental relief, including appointment of a receiver, but such powers presuppose an underlying, validly instituted proceeding.
¶ 39–46Section 141 CPC extends CPC procedure to miscellaneous proceedings only insofar as applicable and cannot override the substantive safeguards embodied in Section 92.
¶ 42–47The inherent power under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised in conflict with an express or implied statutory scheme, and general provisions cannot derogate from the special requirements of Section 92.
¶ 48–52The Court relied on R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar, which treats leave under Section 92 as peremptory, and distinguished the broader protective approach in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal and other authorities as unavailable where jurisdiction itself has not arisen.
¶ 43, 48–50Nevertheless, following the principle recognised in R.M. Narayana Chettiar, the Court held that notice before granting leave may be dispensed with where urgent circumstances make prior notice impracticable, provided reasons are recorded.
¶ 57–59Provisions in the judgment · 11 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 11 provisions
Section 92Section 94Section 151Section 141Section 122Section 125Section 9Section 80Section 86Section 91Section 2604Reasoning
The Court treated the leave application under Section 92 as a threshold or gateway proceeding rather than a substantive suit.
¶ 35–38Although the application was registered separately under the Karnataka Civil Rules of Practice, that procedural registration did not create a pending suit or confer jurisdiction to entertain interlocutory applications.
¶ 35–38Since no valid Section 92 suit existed before leave was granted, an application for appointment of a receiver under Order XL Rule 1(a) could not be maintained as a supplemental proceeding under Section 94; the phrase “whether before or after decree” in Order XL also presupposed a properly instituted suit.
¶ 39–46The Court rejected the argument that the receiver’s allegedly preservatory character could cure the lack of jurisdiction, observing that appointment of a receiver in a public trust would displace existing management and could prejudice the trust if leave were ultimately refused.
¶ 53–56Section 151 and the principle favouring an interpretation that preserves jurisdiction could not be invoked to bypass the mandatory statutory safeguard in Section 92.
¶ 48–52At the same time, the Court balanced the protective purpose of Section 92 with the need to prevent imminent harm by holding that, where compelling urgency is shown, the Court may grant leave without prior notice and thereafter exercise interim jurisdiction in the instituted suit; such departure must be supported by cogent reasons and remains subject to challenge or revocation by the defendants.
¶ 57–5905Holding
The Supreme Court held that a Civil Court cannot pass protective or preservatory interim orders, including appointing a receiver under Order XL Rule 1(a), while an application for leave under Section 92 CPC is pending.
¶ 60Such jurisdiction arises only after leave has been granted and the suit is instituted.
¶ 60However, where compelling urgency is demonstrated, the Court may dispense with prior notice and grant leave ex parte, recording reasons in writing; interim relief may then be considered in the duly instituted suit.
¶ 57–60With this clarification, the appeals were dismissed and the pending applications were disposed of.
¶ 61Original Court PDF
S. PanchalinguvsPeoples Education Trust (R)
Click to open original judgment
Original judgment, available to read, download and summarize on LawLens.in
