Sections 113A and 113B presumptions require foundational evidence of cruelty; early marital death alone is insufficient.

Sunitaben married respondent No. 1 on 18 April 2008.

On 27 April 2008, she sustained burn injuries at her matrimonial home and died during treatment on 2 May 2008.

Her mother lodged a complaint on 12 June 2008, alleging cruelty and harassment over dowry demands.

The Trial Court acquitted the respondents of offences under Sections 498-A, 306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The State appealed under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in acquitting the respondents

2. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law or fact in appreciating the prosecution evidence

3. Whether the acquittal suffered from illegality or perversity warranting appellate interference

Section 498-A IPC criminalises specified forms of cruelty by a husband or his relative, including wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide and harassment connected with an unlawful demand.

Under Sections 306 and 107 IPC, conviction for abetment of suicide requires proof of abetment through instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid.

Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 permits—but does not require—a presumption of abetment where a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and her husband or relative subjected her to cruelty; the statutory foundational facts must first be established.

Section 113B likewise requires proof of its foundational facts, including dowry-related cruelty or harassment soon before death.

On an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, but must account for the reinforced presumption of innocence; where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed.

The Court found that the mother’s complaint was lodged about one and a half months after the incident, without an adequate explanation for the delay, and that the earlier statements recorded during the investigation did not allege cruelty or harassment.

The deceased had spent only a limited period at her in-laws’ home, and the relatives’ testimony did not provide specific or substantive details corroborating the allegations.

The post-mortem doctor’s opinion left open the possibility of accidental burns, while the evidence did not establish that the respondents instigated, aided or otherwise abetted suicide.

As the prosecution failed to establish the requisite cruelty or harassment, the Court held that the statutory presumptions could not be invoked; it found the Trial Court’s assessment reasonable and not perverse.

It dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and order of acquittal; the bail bond was cancelled, and the record and proceedings were directed to be returned to the Trial Court.