Stigmatic termination of a contractual employee without departmental inquiry is unsustainable.

The petitioner challenged the order dated 15 October 2025 terminating his contractual service and the appellate order dated 17 March 2026 rejecting his challenge to the termination.

He sought quashing of both orders, reinstatement with consequential benefits and back wages.

The petitioner contended that the controversy was covered by the High Court’s decision in Kishan Gambhir v. State of M.P., W.P. No. 34746 of 2026, decided on 11 September 2026.

The State opposed the petition but was unable to distinguish the facts or legal position in Kishan Gambhir.

In the analogous case, the Court had held that termination based on allegations of serious financial and official misconduct, without a regular departmental inquiry, was stigmatic and contrary to Clause 7.2 of the MGNREGA Policy.

The present petition was accordingly decided on the same terms.

Whether the petitioner’s termination order, being founded on allegations carrying stigma and adverse findings regarding his official conduct, could validly be passed without issuance of a charge-sheet and conduct of a regular departmental inquiry.

Whether the appellate order rejecting the petitioner’s challenge could survive when the original termination order was stigmatic, non-speaking and procedurally invalid.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits, and whether the respondents could be granted liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Clause 7.2 of the MGNREGA Policy requires disciplinary proceedings and an opportunity of hearing where serious allegations are made against a contractual employee; termination founded on proved misconduct must follow a legally compliant inquiry.

A termination order that attributes negligence, dereliction of duty, financial irregularity or other misconduct is stigmatic and cannot ordinarily be issued without adherence to natural justice and a regular departmental inquiry; an innocuous termination simpliciter is distinguishable from one founded on misconduct.

The Court relied on Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, 2001 (3) MPLJ 616; Jitendra v. State of M.P., 2008 (4) MPLJ 670; Malkhan Singh Malviya v. State of M.P., ILR (2018) MP 660; Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300; and the decisions in Omprakash Gurjar, Hukumchand Solanki, Arvind Malviya, Rajesh Kumar Rathore, Devkaran Patidar, Nilesh and Mahesh Kumar Maru.

It further applied the requirement that administrative and quasi-judicial orders affecting rights must contain clear, cogent and self-sustaining reasons, as stated in State of Punjab v. Bandip Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 724, Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, and Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 SCC 427.

The Court found that the legal controversy in the present petition was materially identical to that decided in Kishan Gambhir and that the State could not distinguish that precedent.

Applying the principle that a termination founded on allegations of misconduct is stigmatic, the Court held that the respondents could not terminate the petitioner merely after issuing a show-cause notice without framing charges and conducting a regular inquiry.

A show-cause notice and consideration of a reply do not substitute for the procedural safeguards required where the termination is based on disputed allegations carrying adverse consequences for the employee’s reputation and future employment.

Since the original order was legally unsustainable, the appellate order rejecting the petitioner’s challenge could not independently cure the defect; reasons supplied at the appellate stage cannot retrospectively validate an invalid original decision.

The Court therefore applied the relief granted in Kishan Gambhir mutatis mutandis.

The respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith with all consequential benefits, but excluding back wages on the principle of “no work, no pay”.

The respondents were granted liberty to take fresh action against the petitioner in accordance with law, if so advised.

Any pending interlocutory application was disposed of.