Subsequent reversal of a proposition of law by a superior court is not a valid ground for review.

The review applicant (plaintiff) had filed a suit for eviction and mesne profits (CS/257/2018), resulting in a decree dated October 7, 2024

On April 20, 2026, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside the decree, holding it a nullity because the suit involved a commercial dispute but was decided by a judge in the non-commercial division

Two days later, on April 22, 2026, the Supreme Court in Shri Balaji Industrial Engineering Ltd. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. overruled this specific legal position, holding that a judgment cannot be set aside solely for lack of commercial division jurisdiction without examining merits

The applicant subsequently filed these review petitions based on the Supreme Court's subsequent judgment

1. Whether a delay of 54 days in filing the review petitions should be condoned

2. Whether a review is maintainable based on a change or reversal of a proposition of law by a superior court rendered subsequent to the judgment under review

Explanation to Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which stipulates that a decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the court is based, having been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment

Supreme Court precedent in Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. M/s. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. & Ors. (2024 INSC 454), which affirmed that a change in law by a superior court does not afford a ground for review under Order XLVII

The court first condoned the 54-day delay in the interest of justice as it was unopposed

The court observed that its original judgment (dated April 20) followed its own earlier view regarding the lack of jurisdiction of non-commercial divisions in commercial matters

Although the Supreme Court reversed this legal theory on April 22 in Shri Balaji Industrial Engineering Ltd., the High Court held that it was bound by the statutory limitation of Order XLVII of the CPC

Following the "authoritative pronouncement" in K.L. Rathi Steels, the court reasoned that even if a subsequent decision by a superior court wipes the original legal basis out of existence, such a retrospective change in the "law of the land" cannot justify a review of a finally decided matter

The Court condoned the delay in filing but dismissed RVWO/22/2026, RVWO/23/2026, and all connected applications without any order as to costs