Suits cannot be consolidated where their causes of action, issues, and reliefs materially differ.

The applicant challenged the order dated 31 July 2026 passed by the Principal District Judge, Gwalior, in MJC No. 149/2026, rejecting an application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking consolidation of Civil Suit Nos. 7-A/18 and 701-A/17 with Civil Suit No. 445-A/16.

Civil Suit No. 445-A/16 was instituted by Piyush Bhargava for declaration of his share and partition of various family properties, including M/s Gwalior Ice Factory.

Civil Suit Nos. 7-A/18 and 701-A/17 concerned liquidation of M/s Gwalior Ice Factory and rendition of its accounts, and had already been consolidated with each other.

The applicant contended that the principal parties and property were substantially common and that consolidation would serve the interests of justice; he also disputed the finding that consolidation would deprive parties of a right of appeal.

Whether Civil Suit Nos. 7-A/18 and 701-A/17 should be consolidated and tried with Civil Suit No. 445-A/16 under Section 24 CPC on the ground of similarity of parties and subject matter.

Whether the differences in the causes of action, reliefs, issues, and evidence, together with the potential loss of one appellate remedy, justified refusal of consolidation.

The Court applied Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which empowers the competent court to transfer or withdraw suits and consolidate proceedings where doing so advances the ends of justice.

It relied on Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85, which holds that suits may be consolidated where the issues are substantially or completely similar and common evidence and arguments can efficiently determine both matters; consolidation is intended to avoid multiplicity, delay, and expense, while permitting separate decrees where necessary.

The Court further recognized that consolidation should not ordinarily deprive parties of their statutory appellate remedy where the suits involve materially different issues and reliefs.

The Court distinguished the suits by examining their pleadings and reliefs. Civil Suit No. 445-A/16 sought declaration of share and partition of several family properties, whereas Civil Suit Nos. 7-A/18 and 701-A/17 sought liquidation of, and rendition of accounts relating to, only M/s Gwalior Ice Factory.

Although the Ice Factory was one of the properties involved in the partition suit, the Court held that the parties, causes of action, reliefs, and evidence were substantially different.

The partition suit would require evidence concerning the family properties and entitlement to shares, while the other suits would require evidence concerning liquidation and accounts of the firm.

Consequently, the commonality was insufficient to satisfy the test for consolidation under Chitivalasa Jute Mills.

The Court also considered that transferring the suits pending before the Civil Judge to the District Judge could deprive those parties of one level of appeal, and found no justification for doing so in circumstances where the suits were materially dissimilar.

The Principal District Judge had therefore committed no error in rejecting the application under Section 24 CPC.

The civil revision was dismissed.