Superintendent of Police is competent to conduct joint inquiries and impose increment-stoppage penalties on Sub-Inspectors.

The petitioner joined the police service as a Sub-Inspector on 1 June 1983, was promoted as Inspector on 17 February 2006, and subsequently as Deputy Superintendent of Police on 9 January 2015.

While posted at Police Station Bhagva, District Chhatarpur, he and an Assistant Sub-Inspector were subjected to a joint departmental enquiry pursuant to a charge-sheet dated 29 April 2006.

The Enquiry Officer found three charges unproved and one charge partially proved against the petitioner, while all charges against the Assistant Sub-Inspector were found unsubstantiated.

The Superintendent of Police imposed the penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect by order dated 30 September 2007; the petitioner’s departmental appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General on 25 March 2008.

The petitioner challenged these orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending, inter alia, that the Superintendent of Police lacked jurisdiction to conduct the joint enquiry and impose the penalty.

Whether the Superintendent of Police was competent to initiate and conduct a joint departmental enquiry against the petitioner, notwithstanding Rule 18(1) of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.

Whether the Superintendent of Police was competent to impose the penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect upon a Sub-Inspector, whose appointing authority under the Schedule to the 1966 Rules was the Deputy Inspector General of Police.

Whether the petitioner’s representation before the Inspector General ought to have been treated as a revision under Regulation 270 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations, instead of being rejected as an impermissible second appeal.

Whether the challenged disciplinary and appellate orders warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Schedule to the 1966 Rules expressly excludes Class III non-ministerial posts in the Police Department from the application of those Rules, providing that such posts are governed by the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations.

Under Regulation 221, the Superintendent of Police is empowered to initiate departmental proceedings and impose the punishments specified in Regulations 214 to 217; Regulation 214(ii) authorises withholding of increment.

Regulation 228 empowers the Superintendent of Police to record formal proceedings and does not distinguish between individual and joint enquiries.

The Court relied on Raju Singh Ahirwar v. State of M.P., (2017) 4 MPLJ 656, which held that Regulation 228 authorises the Superintendent of Police to initiate proceedings, including a joint enquiry, against police personnel.

Regulation 270 permits suo motu revision by a superior authority and revision on application by the person aggrieved against a final appellate order.

The Court first determined the governing service regime by relying on the Schedule’s Note, which places Sub-Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors—Class III non-ministerial police employees—under the Police Regulations rather than the 1966 Rules.

Consequently, the petitioner could not invoke Rule 18(1) to invalidate the joint enquiry.

Applying Regulations 221, 214(ii), and 228, the Court held that the Superintendent of Police possessed both the authority to initiate the proceedings and the power to impose the punishment of withholding an increment; the fact that the Deputy Inspector General was the appointing authority did not negate the specific disciplinary powers conferred by the Police Regulations.

Although Regulation 270 permitted revision, the Court declined to remand the matter for revisional consideration because the petitioner had already invoked the subsequent channel of challenge by filing a mercy petition, which was dismissed by the competent authority.

The earlier orders had consequently merged into the mercy-petition order, and remand would disrupt the administrative hierarchy.

The Court found no jurisdictional defect, procedural illegality, or other ground justifying writ interference.

It held that the Superintendent of Police was competent to conduct the joint departmental enquiry and to impose the penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect under the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations.

The representation before the Inspector General did not warrant remand for fresh consideration as a revision, since the petitioner had already pursued and exhausted the further remedy of a mercy petition and the orders had merged in the subsequent decision.

Both writ petitions were accordingly dismissed, with no interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.