01Facts
The appellant, a Tehsildar, was convicted under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”), for allegedly demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹1,000 from a former employee seeking recovery of unpaid wages.
¶ 7–10, 16–18The complainant and the shadow witness died before giving evidence at trial.
¶ 17, 40–43The prosecution’s trap case therefore rested on the trap officer’s testimony, recovery of treated currency from the appellant’s coat pocket, and positive chemical wash tests.
¶ 17, 40–43The trial court convicted the appellant, and the High Court affirmed the conviction while reducing the custodial sentence.
¶ 3–4The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, disputing proof of demand and acceptance and the resulting use of the statutory presumption.
¶ 20–20.502Issues
i.Whether the prosecution proved the demand and conscious acceptance of illegal gratification when the complainant and shadow witness were unavailable to testify and the trap officer’s account of what the shadow witness told him was hearsay.
¶ 40–44ii.Whether recovery of the tainted currency and positive chemical wash tests, without proof of demand and acceptance, permitted the court to invoke the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act.
¶ 31–33, 42–48iii.Whether the official records and the appellant’s explanation rebutted the prosecution case and the applicable presumption.
¶ 46–4803Law Applied
The Court applied Section 7 of the PC Act as it stood at the time of the alleged offence, concerning a public servant’s acceptance or obtainment of gratification other than legal remuneration, and Section 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), concerning criminal misconduct by a public servant.
¶ 26–30Under P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., proof of demand is essential; recovery alone cannot sustain conviction.
¶ 32The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) held that demand and acceptance must be proved as facts in issue, by direct or circumstantial evidence; if a complainant has died or is unavailable, other oral, documentary, or circumstantial evidence may establish the case.
¶ 33.1–33.4Section 20’s presumption under Section 7 arises only after the foundational facts are proved, and the presumption does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii).
¶ 33.1–33.4Once applicable, the Section 20 presumption is rebuttable, including on a balance of probabilities.
¶ 34Provisions in the judgment · 8 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section 2Section 7Section 11Section 12Section 13Section 14Section 20
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 313
04Reasoning
The trap officer did not personally hear any demand or see the alleged payment; his account of the shadow witness’s report was hearsay because the shadow witness did not testify.
¶ 41.2–42The recovery and positive wash tests established contact with the treated currency but did not, without proof of demand and conscious acceptance, establish the offences.
¶ 43–45Further, contemporaneous records showed that the appellant’s office had dispatched the cheques on 28 December 2002, that they reached the Labour Department on 1 January 2003, and that the complainant collected them on 7 January 2003.
¶ 46Thus, no related official work remained pending before the appellant on the alleged trap date, 6 January 2003.
¶ 46In light of those records, the appellant’s explanation—that the complainant attempted to place the money in his pocket while expressing gratitude—was plausible and rebutted the presumption on a balance of probabilities.
¶ 47The prosecution therefore failed to prove demand and conscious acceptance, and the Section 20 presumption could not be drawn.
¶ 4805Holding
The Supreme Court held that neither demand nor conscious acceptance of illegal gratification was proved and that the conviction could not be sustained on recovery and chemical tests alone.
¶ 48–49It set aside the High Court’s judgment and the trial court’s conviction, acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the PC Act, and discharged his bail bonds.
¶ 49–50Original Court PDF
Har Parsad GaurvsState(Nct Of Delhi)
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