Taking an official receipt book from a team-in-charge constitutes misconduct by obstructing official duties.

The applicant, a Public Health Inspector with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, was served with a memorandum dated 02.03.2009 proposing departmental proceedings for allegedly obstructing an authorised team constituted to collect fines from defaulters in the Narela Zone.

The charge alleged that, on 21.11.2008, the applicant obstructed the team at the zonal office and snatched an official G-8 receipt book from Shri Hawa Singh, the team in-charge, thereby interfering with the performance of official duties.

The Enquiry Officer relied principally on the statements of the departmental witnesses and concluded that the charge was proved.

After considering the applicant’s representation against the inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the penalty of reduction in the time scale of pay by three stages for three years, with cumulative effect, by order dated 30.07.2015, notified on 20.08.2015.

The applicant’s appeal was rejected by order dated 30.10.2015, notified on 10.11.2015. He consequently approached the Tribunal seeking quashing of the inquiry findings, penalty order and appellate order, along with consequential benefits.

1. Whether the finding of misconduct was sustainable when the evidence showed that the applicant had “taken” rather than “snatched” the G-8 book, and when the wording of the original report had been altered?

2. Whether the departmental inquiry and the findings of the Enquiry Officer were perverse, unsupported by evidence, or otherwise vitiated by legal infirmity warranting judicial interference?

3. Whether the penalty of reduction in the time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect was disproportionate to the proved misconduct?

In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, and Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, the Supreme Court held that a reviewing court or tribunal does not act as an appellate authority to re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own conclusions for those of the departmental authorities; interference is justified where the findings are based on no evidence, are perverse, or the proceedings suffer from violation of natural justice or other material legal infirmity.

As to punishment, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463, establishes that judicial interference is warranted only where the penalty is so disproportionate to the misconduct that it shocks the conscience of the court.

The Tribunal also applied the principle that the substance of the misconduct, rather than the precise verbal distinction between “snatched” and “taken”, determines whether the applicant obstructed official duties.

The Tribunal held that the applicant’s own case did not deny taking the G-8 book from Shri Hawa Singh, who was performing authorised duties as the team in-charge.

The G-8 book was an official receipt book required for the collection of fines, and the applicant had no authority to remove it from the officer responsible for the assignment.

Accordingly, whether the book was “snatched” or merely “taken away” did not materially alter the essential misconduct: the applicant interfered with and obstructed the functioning of the authorised team.

The Tribunal further found that the inquiry finding was supported by the documentary evidence and witness testimony, including the evidence of the then DHO and Shri Hawa Singh. The dispute regarding the alteration of the word “snatched” to “taken”, and the contrary testimony of the defence witness, did not render the finding perverse or unsupported by evidence.

Applying the limited scope of judicial review, the Tribunal declined to re-appreciate the departmental evidence. It also held that the penalty was not so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, particularly considering that the applicant had obstructed the performance of official duties.

The inquiry findings were neither perverse nor based on no evidence, and no violation of natural justice or other material legal infirmity was established.

The penalty of reduction in the time scale of pay by three stages for three years with cumulative effect was not shockingly disproportionate.

The Original Application was dismissed, the impugned disciplinary and appellate orders were left undisturbed, pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of, and there was no order as to costs.